The Historiography of American Intervention in the First World War by Johnston, A. (Andrew M.)
PassPort
In thIs Issue 
The SocieTy for hiSTorianS of american foreign relaTionS review
U.S.-Habsburg Relations
Historiography of American Invervention in WWI 
The Chinese Expeditionary Army
and more... 
April 2014
Page 2   Passport April 2014
Passport
The SocieTy for hiSTorianS of american foreign relaTionS review
Editor 
Andrew L. Johns, Brigham Young University 
Consulting Editor 
Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University 
Production Editor 
Julie Rojewski, Michigan State University
Assistant Editor 
David Hadley, The Ohio State University
Editorial Advisory Board
Kimber Quinney, California State University-San Marcos (2012-2014)
Seth Jacobs, Boston College (2013-2015) 
Brian C. Etheridge, University of Baltimore (2014-2016)
Emeritus Editors
Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University (2003-2012)
William J. Brinker, Tennessee Technological University (1980-2003)
Nolan Fowler, Tennessee Technological University (1973-1980) 
Gerald E. Wheeler, San Jose State College (1969-1973)
Cover Photo: 
Franz Ferdinand, Austria . Created Bain News Service, n.d.. LC-DIG-ggbain-07650 (digital file from original neg.). Acces-
sible here: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/ggb2004007650/. 
Passport Editorial Office:
Peter Hahn, SHAFR Executive Director




Passport is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign 
Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and 
are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to passport@osu.edu is preferred. Submissions should 
follow the guidelines articulated in the Chicago Manual of Style. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited 
to conform to Passport style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for 
obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find 
relevant information on the web at: http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm, or can contact the editor. 
The opinions expressed in Passport do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR, of Brigham Young University, or 
of The Ohio State University. 
The editors of Passport wish to acknowledge the generous financial and institutional support of Brigham Young 
University, the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, The Ohio State University, and the Mershon Center 
for International Security Studies. 
© 2014 SHAFR
 Passport April 2014 Page 3
Passport
The SocieTy for hiSTorianS of american foreign relaTionS review 
Volume 45, Number 1, April 2014
In This Issue
4 Contributors
6 A Roundtable on Nicole Phelps’s U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to   
 the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty Transformed 
  Thomas Schwartz, Alak Sked, Benjamin Coates,  
  Alison Frank Johnson, and Nicole M. Phelps
16 A View from Overseas:  
  Jayita Sarkar
18 Announcing the New Center for Presidential History at SMU  
  Jeffrey A. Engel
22 The Historiography of American Intervention in the  
 First World War  
  Andrew M. Johnston 
30 Energy Crisis of the 1970s: Two FRUS Reviews  
  David S. Painter and Christopher R.W. Dietrich
40 The Chinese Expeditionary Army:  
 Reclaiming China’s Forgotten Veterans     
  Zach Fredman
42 Narrative Reports of the Foreign Agricultural Service 
  David A. Langbart
44 Minutes from the January 2014 SHAFR Council Meeting
47 The Diplomatic Pouch
49 Dispatches
Page 4   Passport April 2014
Contributors
Passport 45/1 (April 2014)
Benjamin Coates is Assistant Professor of History at Wake Forest University, where he teaches the history 
of the United States and the World.  His recent article, “The Pan-American Lobbyist:  William Eleroy Curtis 
and U.S. Empire, 1884-1899,” appeared in the January 2014 issue of Diplomatic History.  He is currently 
revising a manuscript on international law and U.S. foreign relations in the early 20th century titled, Legalist 
Empire.
Christopher R.W. Dietrich is Assistant Professor of History at Fordham University.  His research and 
teaching focus on the history of U.S. foreign relations, 20th century America, energy history, and the 
international history of U.S.-Third World relations.  He is completing a book on the history of anti-colonial 
law and economics between 1949 and 1974, and has published articles in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Itinerario, 
and the International History Review.  He received his doctorate from the University of Texas at Austin in 
2012, and currently serves as the graduate student representative on the SHAFR Council.
Jeffrey A. Engel is the founding director of Southern Methodist University’s Center for Presidential 
History.  Author or editor of eight books on American foreign policy–including, with Mark Lawrence and 
Andrew Preston, America in the World:  A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror 
(2014)–he is currently writing When the World Seemed New:  George H.W. Bush and the Surprisingly Peaceful 
End of the Cold War.
Zach Fredman is a Ph.D. candidate in History at Boston University, working under the supervision of 
Andrew Bacevich.  His research has been published in Diplomatic History and Diplomacy and Statecraft.  
Research for his dissertation, tentatively entitled, “A Wary Embrace: American Soldiers and the People of 
China, 1941-1947,” is being supported by a Boren Fellowship and a W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship 
from SHAFR.
Alison Frank Johnson is Professor of History and Associate Director of the Center for History and 
Economics at Harvard University.  She is the author of Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia 
(2005), which was awarded the Barbera Jelavich Book Prize, the Austrian Cultural Forum Book Prize, and 
the Polish Studies Association Orbis Book Prize; and articles in the American Historical Review and Central 
European History.  She is currently working on her next book, Invisible Empire:  A New Global History of 
Austria.
Andrew M. Johnston is Associate Professor of History at Carleton University in Ottawa.  He is the author 
of Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First Use, 1945-1955 (2005).  His current research 
looks at the intellectual and cultural history of internationalism in the generation before and during the 
First World War.  He was a past director of Western University’s Centre for American Studies and associate 
director of Carleton’s Research Centre in American Studies.
 Passport April 2014 Page 5
David A. Langbart is an archivist in the Textual Archives Services Division of the National Archives and 
Records Administration.
David S. Painter is Associate Professor of History in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown 
University.  He is the author of The Cold War:  An International History (1999), Oil and the American Century:  
The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954 (1986), and articles in the Journal of American 
History, Diplomatic History, and Cold War History; and co-editor, with Melvyn Leffler, of Origins of the Cold 
War:  An International History (2005).
Nicole M. Phelps is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Vermont, where she teaches courses 
in diplomatic history, American race relations, and historical methods.  She is the author of U.S.-Habsburg 
Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference:  Sovereignty Transformed (2013), as well as several articles, 
book chapters, and reviews.  She is currently working on her next book, The United States in the World:  U.S. 
Consuls Abroad, 1789-1924.
Jayita Sarkar is a Ph.D. candidate at the Graduate Institute Geneva, and a research fellow at the Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo.  She is currently writing an international history of Franco-Indian 
nuclear relations and U.S. counter-proliferation efforts during the Cold War.
Thomas Schwartz is Professor of History at Vanderbilt University.  He is the author of America’s Germany:  
John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (1991) and Lyndon Johnson and Europe:  In the Shadow of 
Vietnam (2003), and is a past president of SHAFR.
Alan Sked is Professor of International History at the London School of Economics.  He is the author of 
several books on Habsburg history, including The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815-1918 (2001); 
Metternich and Austria:  An Evaluation (2008); and Radetzky:  Imperial Victor and Military Genius (2011).  He is 
also the editor of Europe’s Balance of Power, 1815-1848 (1979).
Page 6   Passport April 2014
Roundtable Introduction
Thomas Schwartz
If you teach a survey course on the history of American foreign relations, chances are that you don’t spend very much time on the Austria-Hungarian Empire, or “the 
Habsburgs,” as Nicole Phelps refers to that multinational 
empire in her remarkable new book.  My own 19th century 
lectures frequently deal with Great Britain, since Britain 
presented the greatest challenge to the young republic, 
and occasionally France, which was nice enough to sell 
us Louisiana but then tried to take advantage of the Civil 
War by playing around in Mexico.  Czarist Russia enters 
the picture when John Quincy Adams sought to scare 
it off with the Monroe Doctrine, and I love reading the 
passage from Alexis de Tocqueville in the 1830s predicting 
a confrontation between America and Russia sometime in 
the future.  Finally, Spain gets a nod as well, and its defeat by 
the United States in the Spanish-American War helps to cap 
off the 19th century and allows me to plunge into the more 
comfortable surroundings of 20th century American power. 
Austria-Hungary then gets a brief mention, playing second 
fiddle to their German ally in talking about World War I. 
The break-up of the Empire only gets discussed in trying 
to make the Versailles peace conference understandable to 
my students.  As Rodney Dangerfield may have put it, the 
Habsburgs get no respect.
Phelps is out to change that perception.  Her elegantly 
written and presented argument is captured in the subtitle, 
“Sovereignty Transformed.”  It is an ambitious task for a 
book about U.S.-Habsburg relations, and the commentators 
in this forum express some skepticism as to whether the 
book fully succeeds in its ambition.  Phelps emphasizes 
three central points.  The first is the degree to which in its 
relations with the Habsburgs, the United States adopted 
the norms and accepted the rules of the Great Power system 
established by the Congress of Vienna.  Phelps takes this 
story through the 19th century, providing a particularly 
insightful take on American popular enthusiasm for the 
Hungarian revolutionary Lajos Kossuth, which threatened 
the diplomatic relationship with the Habsburgs.  Yet after 
the Civil War the United States increasingly adhered to the 
international norms, a practice that ultimately reinforced 
Habsburg legitimacy.
The second and most innovative point deals with the 
topic of immigration, something that foreign relations 
scholars should realize is too important to be left to the 
social historians.1  Phelps deals with the establishment and 
development of American consuls in Austria-Hungary and 
their counterparts, the Habsburg consulates in the United 
States.  Both ended up having plenty of business, even 
though trade between the two countries remained modest. 
The real activity of the consulates came in dealing with 
the hundreds of thousands of people from the lands of the 
Habsburg Empire who came to the United States, some of 
whom stayed and many of whom traveled back and forth in 
an era of increasingly less expensive transatlantic voyages. 
This created a significant connection between the United 
States and Austria-Hungary which has been below the 
radar of most diplomatic historians.  Phelps wisely chooses 
to tell this story by using some fascinating case studies—
for example, a workman’s compensation case in which 
the Habsburg consulate represented an Austrian citizen 
suing the city of Spokane; and a criminal case involving 
an American who claimed dual citizenship but was being 
prosecuted in Krakow, then part of the Empire.  As World 
War I approached, Phelps documents other cases of men 
claiming American citizenship to avoid military service in 
the Imperial Army.  For this part of her book Phelps has 
done exhaustive research in the consular records of both 
countries, and she provides a model for exploring this 
very human and grassroots way in which foreign relations 
affected thousands of ordinary men and women.
The third point which Phelps provides is a strong 
critique of Wilsonian diplomacy coming from, as 
Phelps admits in the roundtable, her sympathy for the 
multinational Habsburg Empire compared to the more 
racially and ethnically pure successor states that took its 
place.  Woodrow Wilson’s refusal to see the new Habsburg 
ambassador in 1916 opened the door for various nationalist 
groups to lobby for their goal of statehood.  Wilson, like 
many presidents since, cut out the State Department for 
advice on dealing the Habsburg territories at the Versailles 
conference, instead relying on academic experts, many of 
whom were influenced by the scientific racism of the time. 
The cry of “self-determination” led to the attempt to create 
monolingual, ethnically pure states in a region in which the 
mixing of peoples made this an impossibility.  The result, 
encouraged by Wilson and the Americans, was to create the 
seeds for future conflict.
A Roundtable on 
Nicole Phelps’s U.S.-Habsburg 
Relations from 1815 to the Paris 
Peace Conference:  
Sovereignty Transformed
Thomas Schwartz, Alan Sked, Benjamin Coates, Alison Frank Johnson, Nicole M. Phelps
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Although I certainly recognize the racial issues which 
Phelps emphasizes, allow me to make the claim that what 
she really is demonstrating is the degree to which the 
United States, even in the Wilsonian era, found its foreign 
policy heavily influenced by grubby domestic politics.  The 
various ethnic groups in the United States—the Czechs, 
Poles, and others who lobbied for their national states—
represented votes in the Democratic coalition, and whatever 
else American politicians respond to, votes matter.  By 
contrast, how many votes would the Habsburgs command?
The commentary in this roundtable provides for a 
vigorous debate about the book’s arguments and the 
strengths and weaknesses of its approach to such topics as 
sovereignty, race, and the new international order.  Alison 
Frank Johnson, who specializes in Central and East European 
History, focuses her commentary on the issues of race and 
nation and the importance of American understanding 
of these ideas for the ultimate fate of the Habsburg 
Empire.  Benjamin Coates, whose research has examined 
international lawyers and American power, examines the 
Phelps book in light of its claims for the transformation of 
sovereignty.  Alan Sked, an internationally known expert 
on the Habsburg Monarchy, is the most critical, calling 
the Phelps book “intellectually misconceived and mostly 
derivative.”  Phelps, however, defends her work in an able 
and erudite response that highlights the issues at stake in 
this debate.
Coates concludes his review by noting that Phelps’s 
book “demonstrates that this overlooked relationship 
should be overlooked no longer.”  On this point I think 
readers of this roundtable will agree.  Let me conclude with 
a personal anecdote that reading this book caused me to 
recall.  My paternal grandfather died the year before I was 
born, but there was considerable family lore about him. 
He came from what was then Austria-Hungary, the area 
near the city of Lembach, now Lviv and part of Ukraine. 
A bricklayer and bartender in America, he and his family 
were among the thousands of people Phelps writes about 
who went back and forth between the United States and the 
Habsburg Empire.  But fortunately he found himself in the 
United States in 1914 when he received his notice for military 
service for the Emperor.  According to family legend, he 
loudly replied with a string of colorful obscenities and the 
simple statement, “I’m an American now.”  There may be 
many ways to interpret my grandfather’s decision, but I 
remain grateful he made that choice.
Notes:   
1. Donna Gabaccia makes exactly this point in her book,  Foreign 
Relations: Global Perspectives on American Immigration (2012).  I 
want to thank my friend and graduate school classmate, the 
distinguished Austrian historian Gűnter Bischof, for this 
reference and sharing with me his thoughts on this book.
Review of Nicole Phelps, U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 
1815 to the Paris Peace Conference:  
Sovereignty Transformed
Alan Sked
This book is clearly written and contains some enjoyable anecdotes. However, it is intellectually misconceived and mostly derivative. The only 
original chapters are those three that deal with either U.S. 
consuls in Austria-Hungary or the consuls of the Habsburg 
Monarchy working in the United States. All other chapters 
are based on the works of others. The impression given 
is that the author, having done research on the consular 
systems of both powers, needed to set it into some sort 
of wider context and so came up with the idea of placing 
her three chapters on consular work between others—
one a general history of diplomatic practice, one a general 
survey of nineteenth-century history, one on disputes 
over diplomatic formalities, a later one on the history of 
U.S. policy regarding peacemaking in 1917–19, and the 
conclusion, which deals with enforcing the Versailles 
settlement in Central Eastern Europe. 
The trouble is that there is no real theme or thesis to 
all these general chapters. Moreover, they betray a lack of 
authority. In the chapter on diplomacy we are told several 
times of notes verbalés instead of notes verbales (the term is 
also in the index); the chapter on general history is based 
on an uncritical reading of Paul Schroeder’s views and 
gives an inflated view of Talleyrand supposedly based on 
Kissinger’s A World Restored (1957), in which Talleyrand’s 
reputation is deflated. The chapter on the diplomatic 
disputes over formal procedures is also rather shaky in 
parts. Phelps believes that the United States gave more 
support to the Hungarians in 1848–9 than anyone else, 
although  knowledge of the key works by Istvan Hajnal or 
Domokos Kosary (admittedly in Hungarian) might suggest 
otherwise. Nor is there any use of either William H. Stiles’s 
two-volume Austria in 1848–49 (1852) or John Lothrop 
Motley’s two stout volumes of published correspondence, 
which might have added some color. However, the main 
failing in this chapter is the assumption—made also in the 
introduction—that it was only relations with the Habsburg 
Monarchy that drew the United States into the “Great 
Power System.” That assumption is, to say the least, highly 
unlikely. America’s diplomatic relations with Britain and 
France were what shaped her understanding of diplomacy. 
The real problem with the book is that it is not about 
U.S.-Habsburg relations at all. Since the United States had 
little trade and few treaties with the Monarchy and since 
U.S. diplomacy is considered obtuse and amateurish 
throughout, Phelps has absolutely nothing to say about U.S. 
policy. What the State Department or White House thought 
of Habsburg actions in the nineteenth century, we never 
discover. All we are told about is difficult individual cases 
that consuls dealt with. Great power diplomacy itself is 
totally omitted until we arrive at 1917 and find out about 
some of Wilson’s not-too-bright advisers on Central Europe, 
although we are still not told how Wilson developed his 
policies. There is a little discussion of British diplomacy 
after 1917, but the diplomacy of all the other great powers 
is passed over.
In the final analysis, the book does not add up. Exactly 
what it is trying to argue is unclear. The thesis seems to 
be that consular problems with the Habsburg Monarchy 
dragged the United States into the “Great Power System,” 
but that argument is surely bizarre. So this mixture of 
four discrete chapters on diplomacy, history, diplomatic 
protocol, peace-making, and enforcement in 1919–21 
with three original chapters on consular work leaves this 
reviewer perplexed.           
Exploring the Transnational Origins of International 
Order 
Benjamin Coates
Intertwined histories of crisis and war make some countries natural pairs for historical analysis. One thinks of Russia and Germany, France and Great Britain, 
or the United States and any of the dozen or so countries 
it confronted or occupied in the twentieth century. But the 
United States and Austria-Hungary, the subject of Nicole 
Phelps’s U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace 
Conference: Sovereignty Transformed, do not at first glance 
make an auspicious couple. The two had little trade and 
fewer diplomatic crises. Even as America’s enemy in World 
War I, Austria-Hungary played second fiddle to Germany. 
As Phelps admits, Austria-Hungary and the United States 
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“did not have the kind of relationship that has traditionally 
attracted diplomatic historians” (1). 
In Phelps’s capable hands, however, U.S.-Habsburg 
relations reveal nothing less than the transformation of 
sovereignty itself. Focusing in particular on the consular 
services of each power, this wide-ranging and copiously 
documented book is in some ways very traditional: the old 
history of “what one clerk said to another.” But by situating 
these clerks at the center of changing discourses of race and 
nation, Phelps mixes transnational and international history 
to demonstrate how new conceptions of sovereignty led to 
the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the transformation of 
world politics in 1919. The result is a brilliant and original 
account of how the United States at first embraced and 
then fundamentally transformed the “Old Diplomacy” of 
the Concert of Europe. It prompts us to reconsider just how 
“American” Wilsonian diplomacy actually was.
Phelps plots her story in a narrative of Rise and Fall. 
She begins with a brief and accessible history of diplomatic 
practice, culminating in the creation of what she calls 
the “Great Power System” at the Congress of Vienna in 
1815. This arrangement—often referred to as the “Vienna 
System”—privileged state sovereignty. Treaties and laws 
recognized and were attached to territorialized states, not 
princes or peoples. The system promoted non-interference, 
political equilibrium, and continental peace. It also upheld 
the legitimacy of the multiethnic Habsburg empire, which 
incorporated people of many cultures and languages, 
including Poles, Austrians, Magyars, Czechs, and many 
more. 
But this equilibrium collapsed amidst the chaos of 
World War I, and by 1919 both the Great Power System and 
the Habsburg empire were no more. In place of a recognized, 
cooperative community of territorialized, quasi-dynastic 
empires, the new “Paris System” (as Eric Weitz has called 
it) recognized ethnic nationalism as the ideal basis of 
statehood.1 Meanwhile, the hyphen connecting the dual 
monarchy of “Austria-Hungary” became a comma dividing 
separate nation-states, while other Habsburg territories 
were parceled out to new states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia) and old ones (Italy, Romania). Yet instead 
of promoting peace through self-government, as its 
creators hoped, the new system witnessed worse horrors, 
culminating in ethnic cleansing amid a second, even more 
terrible, world war.
Phelps is not alone in lamenting the passing of the 
Vienna system.2 But she offers several new perspectives. 
She begins by taking the elaborate diplomatic procedure 
of the Great Power system seriously. Its carefully scripted 
behaviors were not simply aristocratic frivolity, she argues. 
Drawing on the work of international relations theorist 
Alexander Wendt, Phelps emphasizes the importance of 
behavior, norms, and ritual in constituting the system. 
In performing various rituals and stylized practices—
presenting themselves to a head of state with a formal letter 
of introduction, referring to sovereigns as “Your Excellency” 
in correspondence—diplomats recognized each other’s 
legitimacy and created expectations of cooperation. In 
social settings, meanwhile, diplomats cultivated personal 
relationships that allowed them to smooth the rough edges 
of great power competition. In great measure, style was 
substance, Phelps suggests: court behavior maintained 
international peace and order.
By tracing U.S.-Habsburg diplomacy in detail, Phelps 
shows how the United States learned to stop worrying and 
love the Vienna system. At first, many in the young United 
States rejected Vienna’s stylized diplomatic behavior as the 
illegitimate fruit of aristocracy. In 1849 U.S. government 
officials openly rooted on Hungarian nationalists, 
demonstrating—at least implicitly—that they favored a 
Habsburg collapse. But by 1903 Washington and Vienna 
had raised their diplomatic representatives to the level of 
“ambassador,” signaling mutual recognition and America’s 
official membership in the club of Great Powers. Phelps 
tells this story through a series of lesser-known diplomatic 
exchanges through which the United States gradually 
accepted the dominant diplomatic protocols to which it had 
earlier objected. Washington even agreed to seek Austria-
Hungary’s pre-approval of ambassadors to ensure they 
would fit in socially at court. 
By the turn of the century, then, the U.S. State 
Department had become “the American institutionalization 
of the Great Power System” (9). This is an important and 
useful perspective: by examining the nation’s rise through 
Habsburg eyes, Phelps reminds us that in “Becoming 
a Great Power” (the title of her second chapter), the 
country was not simply charting a new, exceptionalist 
course toward global domination; in important respects 
it was adopting behavior already modeled by European 
empires. This notion contributes to a growing body of 
work revealing the United States’ sustained if uneven 
engagement with international law in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.3 By emphasizing the changing forms 
of U.S. diplomacy, Phelps puts another stake into the heart 
of the isolationist myth.
However, by focusing on form, Phelps leaves hazy 
the role of power—and especially imperial power—in the 
“Great Power System.” In this era, being a Great Power 
meant not only obeying diplomatic norms, but also ruling 
others against their will (Japan illustrates the truth of 
this maxim clearly: the nation earned international legal 
equality only after becoming an empire in its own right).4 
Phelps alludes briefly to those Americans who drew on 
concepts of “civilization” and “Anglo-Saxonism” to make 
the case for engagement with the Great Power system 
(91-2). But I wanted to know more about the role that the 
increasing willingness of some Americans to identify as 
“imperialists” played in promoting U.S. participation in 
the Vienna system.5 A more direct engagement with empire 
might also qualify the sometimes elegiac tone that surfaces 
in Phelps’s writing. Without explicit stating it, Phelps 
sometimes gives the impression not only of defending 
the Habsburg empire in comparison to the exclusionary 
nationalisms that replaced it, but of making the case that 
a conservative politics of empire is the most desirable way 
to deal with diversity. Though the Great Power System’s 
norm of non-intervention helped to keep the peace between 
empires, it did little or nothing to mitigate violence against 
colonial subjects.6
The strongest part of the book is Phelps’s explanation 
of the “Fall” of the Great Power System. In some ways it 
follows the conventions of the genre: Woodrow Wilson 
plays a central role, emerging in 1918 with a “New 
Diplomacy” that vanquishes the “Old” and takes the 
Habsburg empire down with it. But while critical of 
Wilson, Phelps does not dwell on his personal beliefs nor 
take the kind of entrenched positions on the hoary debates 
over “realism” or “idealism” that so often accompany 
analyses of this period. Rather, she expertly fills in the 
institutional and intellectual environment that surrounded 
the president. In so doing, she reveals that the Habsburg 
collapse was not an inevitable result of the weakness or 
illegitimacy of Habsburg rule, but rather the outcome of 
a complex interaction between governmental and non-
governmental actors. It was not merely an international 
story of negotiations between governments, but also a 
transnational one shaped by  individuals who crossed and 
re-crossed borders. 
These two forces came together in the work of the U.S. 
and Habsburg consular service when migrants sought 
aid from representatives of their home government. 
Phelps explores the workings of this system in often 
meticulous detail. She argues that the expanding volume 
of migration (and return migration) in the late nineteenth 
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century produced increasing tension between two kinds of 
sovereignty. When governments argued over citizenship 
and protected their subjects abroad, they “expected their 
claims to sovereignty over the bodies of their citizens to 
trump territorially based claims to jurisdiction” (107). 
The experience of migration—and the multiplicity of 
organizations serving migrant groups—encouraged the 
rise of the “racial” nationalisms that later split the Habsburg 
empire. Austria-Hungary stressed the political citizenship 
of its subjects: after the rise of the Dual Monarchy, they 
were either Hungarian or Austrian, based on their territory 
of residence. The U.S. State Department recognized these 
categories, but the U.S. Bureau of Immigration did not. 
Instead, it grouped migrants from Habsburg realms under 
frequently shifting racial categories, including “Bohemian 
and Moravian,” “Dalmatian, Bosnian & Hercegovinian,” 
Magyar, Slovak, Hebrew, and Syrian. Meanwhile, 
benevolent societies that had formed to aid migrants to the 
United States also organized themselves along ethnic lines 
and often encouraged Bohemians or Magyars who returned 
home to push for national rather than imperial rights. Thus 
the interaction between the U.S. administrative state and the 
migrant experience contributed to the rise of nationalism 
among Habsburg subjects. Phelps quotes historian Ernest 
Spaulding’s judgment that Czech nationalism—and with 
it, the eventual Czech state—was “made in America” (181).
Phelps’s study of U.S.-Habsburg relations thus reveals 
the broader conditions of possibility for the postwar 
emergence of a “Wilsonian world of conformity and 
immutable and all-important racial identity” (281). For 
instance, Phelps shows that The Inquiry—the group of 
experts formed to advise Wilson on postwar plans—had 
almost no real knowledge of Austria-Hungary. In their 
ignorance, Inquiry experts relied subconsciously on the 
type of “race thinking” that dominated American academic 
and official discourses and were easily manipulated by 
nationalist groups. Most strikingly, the Czecho-Slovak 
council managed to convince them of the “patently false” 
claim that Czech and Slovak were essentially the same 
language and that the two groups thus ought to be united 
in an independent nation (249). While military and political 
considerations obviously weighed heavily in 1919, the 
basic “racial” assumptions of key policymakers make it 
possible to explain the specific lines of demarcation that 
divided former Habsburg domains. Phelps thus helps us 
to see Wilsonian diplomacy not as a pure reflection of an 
“isolated” or innocent United States, but rather as emerging 
from a deeper history of interaction between the New 
World and the Old. 
The narrow shoulders of the U.S.-Habsburg relationship 
are not strong enough to bear the entire weight of the 
global transformation of sovereignty. Many other actors 
and processes—including minority protection treaties 
and imperial civilizing missions—contributed to the 
idea that populations and not just territory should form a 
legitimate interest of the international system.7 But Phelps 
convincingly makes the case that the intersection between 
Austro-Hungarian migrants, Habsburg bureaucracy, and 
U.S. officials played a fundamental role. Whether or not one 
agrees with Phelps’s estimation of its causal importance, 
U.S.-Habsburg Relations demonstrates that this overlooked 
relationship should be overlooked no longer. 
Notes: 
1. Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: Interna-
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“Our American Model”: U.S.-Habsburg Relations 
and European Race
Alison Frank Johnson
In U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference, Nicole Phelps makes an observation that might seem obvious to U.S. readers in the opening 
decade of the twenty-first century but would have seemed 
utterly perplexing to Austrian and Hungarian statesmen 
one hundred years earlier: the opinions that Americans—
including statesmen and diplomats, but also simple 
voters—held of the Habsburg Empire and its citizens 
mattered. They mattered because, at the peace conferences 
in Paris that followed the First World War, President 
Wilson’s views on the “right to national self-determination” 
became accepted as the fundamental guideline for settling 
the question of disputed European frontiers. These were 
not the views of Wilson alone, but rather reflected a broader 
range of American ideas about race and nation. National 
self-determination was a concept built largely on the ruins 
of Europe’s most notoriously multinational empire: it was 
not considered compatible with the existence of Austria-
Hungary.
The notion of 1919 as a global “Wilsonian moment” has 
been elaborated elsewhere.1 So have the myriad ways in 
which the effort to organize Europe into self-determined 
nation-states was wrongheaded, poorly executed, and led to 
a disastrous constriction of individuals’ rights to determine 
their own nationalities and the states to which they 
belonged.2 But nowhere has the dissolution of the Habsburg 
Empire been tied so tightly to developments in the United 
States. The author of the phrase “Wilsonian moment,” Erez 
Manela (whom Phelps cites repeatedly and respectfully), 
argues that it was the anticolonial nationalists, not Wilson, 
who must be recognized as the main protagonists of 1919.3 
Wilson does not stand at the center of Phelps’s story, either, 
but U.S. policy towards the Habsburg empire and its 
citizens on U.S. soil emphatically does: “During World War 
I and the subsequent peace conference, years of thinking 
[in] racialist terms manifested themselves in the actions 
of the American delegation and ultimately resulted in the 
break-up of the Habsburg Empire” (198, emphasis added). 
Thus it was not Wilson alone who racialized European 
political legitimacy, but dozens, scores, hundreds, perhaps 
thousands of American civil servants, judges, lawyers, 
bureaucrats, and other employees of the U.S. government 
who collectively refused to accept the political sovereignty 
of a hodgepodge empire like Austria in the presumptively 
modern era of nations.
Some readers may almost reflexively rebel against 
this argument, in particular those who object to the form 
of American exceptionalism that places the United States 
at the center of every story. When Phelps describes the 
peremptory dismissal of the Austrian ambassador in 
November 1915, a full two years before the United States 
declared war on Austria-Hungary, and proposes that “not 
trying to send another ambassador then may have been 
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the Austro-Hungarian government’s biggest mistake 
of the war,” some readers may immediately be tempted 
to list half a dozen alternate blunders. But this is not an 
irresponsible book, and Phelps will convince even the 
most skeptical reader that there is much to be said for her 
argument.  Indeed, the conclusion to Phelps’s monograph 
(modestly called “After the Peace” rather than something 
more appropriate like “All Prior Understandings of 
1919 Upended”) is stunning. A reader may bridle at the 
assertion on page 277 that “the Wilson administration had 
also achieved the removal of the allegedly autocratic and 
oppressive Habsburg Empire from Central Europe and its 
replacement with states that conformed more thoroughly 
with their vision of the ideal state,” as if Britain, France, 
and a handful of domestic nationalist movements had just 
stood idly by. But any real resistance to Phelps’s argument 
is quickly disarmed by a lesson in its origins. Twenty-first 
century readers have been trained not to see the influence 
of the United States in the postwar settlement, in part by 
the participants, who “began to write themselves out of the 
story of the country’s break-up almost immediately” (279). 
After all, the consensus that “the roots of both World War 
II and the Cold War” were to be found in the Paris treaties 
“did not encourage many American historians to embrace 
American agency in their construction,” as Phelps puts it. 
Blame was shifted away from “the larger [American] society 
that so many more people had a role in shaping” and onto 1) 
a few lone individuals or 2) the unwieldy empire itself, now 
painted in the anachronistic colors of “decline, twilight, 
eclipse, fall, and backwardness” (280). 
Phelps explains the obduracy of this silence by pointing 
to the organization of academia, which placed U.S. history 
and European history into separate fields, and the relative 
lack of interest in bi-national histories in favor of national 
histories. She could have added the racial extremism that 
became the defining characteristic of German Europe’s 
twentieth century, and, within the United States, the shift 
away from overtly racial understandings of different 
European nations in favor of a single-minded division of the 
world into “white” and “colored.” Phelps asks her readers to 
sweep away all their preconceived notions about American 
innocence and inevitable Habsburg deterioration. Doing 
so, she argues, will reveal that “the nation-state system is 
historically contingent . . . and human beings—including 
many Americans—were essential agents in its creation. It 
is a product of long-term debates over sovereignty, identity, 
and diplomatic culture and the specific circumstances of 
World War I. The outbreak of World War I, coupled with 
Wilson’s election, brought people to the fore who were 
willing to change and created the opportunity for change to 
occur” (281, emphasis added). And what did Wilson believe 
to be the most fundamental attributes of the new nation-
states that would make up the redesigned international 
system? “They were democratic and they were capitalist, 
and to be democratic, they first had to be racially pure.” 
Ultimately, it is the final characteristic that Phelps finds 
most salient, as her concluding sentence makes clear: “The 
Habsburg central government’s commitment to diversity, 
consensus, and political citizenship had no place in a 
Wilsonian world of conformity and immutable and all-
important racial identity” (281).
This observation comes at the end of a monograph in 
which Phelps painstakingly reproduces the emergence 
of “racial identity” as “all-important” in a United States 
beset with immigrants from the Habsburg Empire. “The 
movement of people from the Habsburg Empire to the 
United States and back again provided a conduit for 
ideas about racial nationalism and the specific categories 
adopted by the U.S. government to make their way back 
to the Habsburg Empire, where they contributed to the 
development of national identities at the expense of 
Habsburg political citizenship” (7, emphasis added). This 
interaction between Austria and the United States may 
have contributed in dramatic fashion to the dissolution of 
the Habsburg Empire, but the most profound cause, Phelps 
finds, was a changing understanding of sovereignty and 
the international political system: away from the Great 
Power diplomatic culture based on territorially bounded 
political citizenship and towards a post-1919 racial-national 
organization of states.
By the time the war was over, Phelps argues, no one in 
the United States really believed in the political integrity 
of Austria-Hungary. Nationalists from various constituent 
parts of the empire had been agitating for independence 
(for Czechs, for Poles) or redrawn borders (for Italians, 
for Romanians) for much of the war. Phelps stresses that 
once diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Austria-Hungary ceased (which happened functionally 
in November 1915, when the United States insisted that an 
unpopular Habsburg ambassador be recalled, although not 
formally until the United States declared war on Austria-
Hungary in December 1917), there was no one left to argue 
the case for the empire’s continued existence.  
But the battle for Austria-Hungary’s legitimacy in U.S. 
opinion seems to have been lost much earlier. Phelps shows 
that most Americans had stopped believing in the Habsburg 
monarchy long before the war began. Austria-Hungary 
simply did not make sense within the racial framework 
on which Americans constructed their world. The political 
categories of “Austrian” and “Hungarian” were the pillars 
on which the empire’s domestic organization had rested 
since 1867.  Within Austria, the existence of many different 
“peoples” (or “nationalities,” or “ethnicities,” or even 
“races,” or in the original German used in the constitution, 
Volksstämme, “tribes”) was famously acknowledged in 
Article 19: “All the peoples of the state shall have equal 
rights, and each people shall have the inviolable right of 
protecting and cultivating its nationality and language.” 
There was no attempt to force homogeneity on this 
heterogeneous population; no one felt it necessary to create 
a uniform, racially “pure” “Austrian” nation. Nor was 
there any legal hierarchy among the state’s peoples. The 
first article of the Austrian constitution of 1867 (which, out 
of deference to the absolutist sensibilities of the monarch, 
was called the “Fundamental Law”) proclaimed that “for 
all people belonging to the various kingdoms and countries 
represented in the Reichsrat there exists a common right of 
Austrian citizenship.” Article 2 declared that “all citizens 
are equal before the law.” 
Hungary had a different set of laws and a different set 
of expectations regarding the primacy of the Hungarian 
language; within Hungary, homogenization was the goal. 
Austro-Hungarian consuls represented both halves of the 
monarchy—the Austrian and the Hungarian—with equal 
care. In the United States, they were forced to reiterate 
constantly that “Austrian” and “Hungarian” were the only 
political categories that should be recognized in diplomacy/
foreign affairs. The consuls were spitting into the wind 
long before the war began. “Hungarian” was a category 
that Americans could understand (but only because the 
word had both political and “national” meanings) —but 
“Austrian”?  
The commitment within the United States to primarily 
racial social organization—the category “American” was not 
nearly as interesting as the contrasting groups “black” and 
“white,” or “Catholic” and “Protestant,” or “Anglo-Saxon” 
and, well, anything else—made “Austrian” a challenge. 
“Austrian” was clearly not a race. For people raised in 
the United States in the post–Civil Rights era, racialist 
thinking is formally unacceptable (even if still functionally 
hegemonic). But racialist thinking survives in the concept 
of “ethnicity” that many Americans hold dear to this day.   
In his superb study of the coal-mining community in 
Ludlow, Colorado, for example, Thomas Andrews bemoans 
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the use of “Austrian” in company statistics, noting that 
“the categories employed often obscured more than they 
revealed—‘Austrian,’ to cite just the most notable example, 
masked such disparate ethnicities as Tyrolean, Croatian, 
Slovenian, Polish, Ruthenian, and German.”4 When 
Andrews lists the workers tallied by the Colorado Fuel 
and Iron company in 1903, he puts scare quotes around 
“Americans, ” “Austrians, ” “Mexicans,” and “Colored,” 
distancing himself from these problematic categories, but 
does not employ them for Italians, Irish, English, Slavs, 
Hungarians, Welsh, Scots, Germans, Swedes, Poles, Greeks, 
French, Swiss, Belgians, Finns, Bohemians, or Dutch.5 What 
is it that the words “Finn,” “Slav,” or “French” can reveal 
that the word “Austrian” obscures? Andrews’s frustration 
that historical documents calling a worker “Austrian” 
prevent us from knowing something important about 
who that worker really was reflects the extent to which a 
watered-down version of the racialized understanding 
of “national identity” that was developed in the late 
nineteenth century survives in the views of “heritage” and 
“ethnicity” prevalent in the U.S. today. 
This racialized understanding was not limited to 
pseudo-scientists like Madison Grant or now-stigmatized 
politicians like James K. Vardaman.6  It informed the 
perspective of U.S. officials in the early twentieth century 
from the Department of Justice to the Department of 
Labor to the U.S. Bureau of Immigration (it is significant 
that the Department of State understood and accepted 
Austria-Hungary’s own categories but was sidelined by 
Wilson in wartime decision-making). It was reproduced 
in everyday bureaucratic transactions, from employment 
lists to immigration flyers, from police reports to judicial 
decisions. In 1909, the Bureau of Immigration (which was 
part of the Treasury Department) provided a handy list of 
the “races and peoples represented by those from Austria-
Hungary.” As Phelps notes, Austria-Hungary was a place 
one could come from, but “Austrian” was not a type of 
person one could be (even if Hungarian was). The list 
included Bohemian and Moravian; Bulgarian, Servian, 
and Montenegrin; Croatian and Slovenian; Dalmatian, 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian; German, Hebrew, Italian 
(north and south); Magyar (used to mean ethnically, rather 
than politically, Hungarian); Polish; Romanian; Ruthenian 
(Ukrainian); Slovak. It also included Lithuanians, Russians, 
French, and Syrians. The magical process of transformation 
by which one person could leave Europe as an “Austrian” 
but arrive in the United States only as a “Pole,” “Italian,” 
or “Croat” is not only a source of frustration for those who 
would like to track Central European emigration patterns 
by political rather than pseudo-ethnic criteria; it also 
helped elevate racial thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. 
“The U.S. Bureau of Immigration’s use of racial identity 
categories to label immigrants undermined Habsburg 
sovereign claims to politically based citizenship and 
conditioned many Americans—and immigrants—to think 
in racial terms” (197).
This is not a simple causal statement, and Phelps is well 
aware of the multitude of other factors, including domestic 
antisemitism (which gets little attention in this book), that 
contributed to the popularity of “think[ing] in racial terms” 
in Central Europe. Despite all of her (generally) cautious 
rhetoric, however, this is likely to be the most controversial 
and startling argument in the book, and it may lead 
readers to focus primarily on the final three chapters and 
the conclusion. But the first four chapters of Phelps’s book 
have merits that are in danger of remaining hidden in the 
shadow of the boldest elements of her argument. The vast 
majority of the book quietly and authoritatively builds up 
the case for a transformation in U.S.-Habsburg relations 
without a trace of polemics. 
The first chapter explains the Great Power system. 
The Great Power system functioned in part by elevating 
those who understood the rules above those who did 
not; it favored those who could play the right part, wear 
the right clothes, use the right ritualistic language. All of 
this is lost on historians who try to examine diplomatic 
correspondence of the nineteenth century without knowing 
how to distinguish a perfect exemplar of good behavior 
from a gross breach of etiquette. Phelps provides a wealth of 
information on the mechanics of the system. What is a note 
verbale (for reasons that are unclear to me, this misleading 
French phrase for a written note appears everywhere in 
the book as “note verbalé”)? What is the difference between 
a chargé d’affaires and an attaché? The Great Power system 
was hierarchical; it was deeply cultured; it required finesse 
and training (if not professional training, then training in 
the habits of European nobility). It was a system designed 
for the Habsburg Empire, and resented, if temporarily 
accepted, by the United States.  
The second chapter covers the formal diplomatic 
relations between the Habsburg Empire and the United 
States (as opposed to consular work) and includes the 
pivotal years around the revolutions of 1848–49. Phelps 
gets at the heart of U.S.-American sympathy for the 
Hungarian revolutionaries: “Like their American, French, 
and Viennese revolutionary predecessors, [Hungarian 
revolutionaries] spoke in universalist, Enlightenment 
terms, but, in reality, they envisioned a state governed by 
a particular group of like-minded people” (54). Theirs was 
just the type of revolutionary conservatism that appealed 
to a U.S. population that “viewed the Hungarians as fellow 
progressive, republican, Protestant revolutionaries and the 
Habsburgs as backward, arbitrary, Catholic despots” (67).7 
This image was reinforced by the Hungarian revolutionary, 
Louis Kossuth, in lecture after public lecture during his 
extended stay in the United States and was embellished in 
Daniel Webster’s vision of “our American model upon the 
lower Danube and the mountains of Hungary.” 8 (Although 
Kossuth’s welcome in the United States would eventually 
wear thin, Istvan Deak has called his tour through Western 
Europe and the United States “a triumphant journey the 
likes of which the world had never seen.”)9 
Like the first chapter, the second continues in the 
informative vein: what were the general points of friction 
between the two states? On what basis did they have 
diplomatic relations at all? Phelps takes the reader from a 
period in which the Habsburg Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
might have considered diplomatic relations with the United 
States barely necessary to a period in which the United 
States considered not just diplomatic relations with but the 
very existence of the Habsburg Empire as nothing more 
than a nuisance.
In the third and fourth chapters, Phelps turns her 
attention away from diplomats and towards consuls. 
Although consuls’ duties have often been imagined—not 
only by historians, but also by consuls themselves—to 
focus primarily on the promotion of and facilitation of 
trade, Phelps’s research suggests that this was true neither 
of U.S. consuls in the Habsburg empire nor of Habsburg 
consuls in the United States. “The duties of a consul,” she 
writes, “had expanded over the course of the [nineteenth] 
century from trade facilitation to trade promotion and, 
finally, to the protection of citizens abroad” (107). In the 
first half of the century, when trade was most important, 
it made sense for consulates to be based largely in port 
cities (the first U.S. consulate in the Habsburg monarchy 
was in Trieste, not Vienna), but by 1880, complications 
surrounding sovereignty and territoriality had so eclipsed 
the limited commercial relations between the two states 
that the most typical duties of U.S. consuls in the Habsburg 
Empire involved the representation of citizens’ legal rights 
in “criminal and civil cases, with divorce proceedings and 
patent investigations being the most common” (116). Consuls 
could also pursue investigations for Americans back home. 
Page 12   Passport April 2014
Could a Missouri button manufacturer rightly assert that 
his Austrian competitors’ buttons were manufactured by 
“convict labor,” as he hoped? Not any more: convicts had 
not been used to make buttons in Bohemia for ten years 
and for fifteen in Vienna (117).
When Ralph Busser, the U.S. consul in Austria’s largest 
Adriatic port, Trieste, boasted in 1915 that “Trieste is 
undoubtedly the business Consulate in Austria” (128), the 
period when Austria could have claimed to be or hoped 
to become one of the leaders of global maritime commerce 
lay decades in the past (Phelps dates the transition, 
perhaps generously, to 1880).  When Phelps claims that 
“the Habsburg Empire has never been famed for its maritime 
prowess . . . and it is difficult to fathom that overseas trade 
was the driving force behind the [consular] service’s 
creation and expansion” (153, emphasis added), however, 
her claim is more appropriate to the last forty years of the 
empire’s existence than the period when the consular corps 
was actually created. The questions of greatest interest 
to Phelps revolve around sovereignty, territory, and the 
complications that arose when a person’s physical location 
and citizenship were not aligned with one another.  It is 
appropriate that her own research concentrates most 
heavily on the period after 1880, when these were also the 
questions of greatest significance to her historical subjects. 
Her story is actually more interesting and more important 
when viewed as describing a transformation from a period 
when overseas trade could be imagined as the driving 
force behind U.S.-Habsburg relations to a period when 
the anticipated movement of goods had been entirely 
overshadowed by the actual movement of people. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, and in 
particular from the 1830s through the 1850s, the Habsburg 
Empire was indeed famed for its maritime prowess. Its 
largest shipping line, the Austrian Lloyd, was among 
the most famous and prestigious of European merchant 
marines.  (When the North German Lloyd was founded 
in 1857, it was named after the more famous Austrian, or 
South German Lloyd. The name Lloyd is preserved to this 
day in the HAPAG Lloyd, the product of a merger between 
the North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-Amerikanische 
Paketfahrt AG in 1970.) The nineteenth-century Habsburg 
consular service was massive—Phelps correctly notes that 
it is nearly impossible to account for all the temporary, 
permanent, honorary, and general consulates that the 
monarchy maintained between 1718 and 1919, but they 
numbered in the hundreds and a great many of them 
were in port cities. Philatelists have found evidence of 
nearly three dozen Austrian and Austro-Hungarian post 
offices operated out of different Habsburg consulates in 
the Ottoman Empire alone (with another forty-three post 
offices operated out of the offices of the Austrian Lloyd in 
the Ottoman Empire). Some of these consulates seem to 
have been of short duration, but their existence suggests the 
degree of penetration into Ottoman commerce that Austria 
was prepared to attempt. In its relative lack of engagement 
with trade, the daily experience of Habsburg consuls in the 
United States, therefore, is not typical of the consular corps 
at large. 
Phelps’s book has self-imposed limits that are both 
geographic and temporal. It invites the thoughtful reader 
to speculate on how its arguments could be expanded in 
future scholarship that picks up threads left at its edges. 
The implications of the argument could fruitfully be 
extended into the interwar period. If the Wilsonian moment 
was really about the emphasis not only on democracy over 
empire and capitalism over socialism but also on racial 
purity, what does one make of W.E.B. DuBois’s argument 
that the version of white supremacy epitomized by the Jim 
Crow South was globalized in the aftermath of the First 
World War? After the First World War, DuBois, who had 
decades earlier studied abroad in Germany and felt himself 
liberated by a society in which he was not recognized as 
black,10 looked at Europe with nothing but disgust. “The 
World War was primarily the jealous and avaricious struggle 
for the largest share in exploiting darker races,” he wrote 
in “The Souls of White Folk.”11 He saw a link between the 
domestic racism of the United States and the global racism 
of European empire. The United States, he wrote, stands 
today shoulder to shoulder with Europe in Europe’s worst 
sin against civilization. She aspires to sit among the great 
nations who arbitrate the fate of “lesser breeds without the 
law” and she is at times heartily ashamed even of the large 
number of “new” white people whom her democracy has 
admitted to place and power. Against this surging forward 
of Irish and German, of Russian Jew, Slav and [Italian] 
her social bars have not availed, but against Negroes she 
can and does take her unflinching and immovable stand, 
backed by this new public policy of Europe. She trains her 
immigrants to this despising of [Negroes] from the day of 
their landing, and they carry and send the news back to the 
submerged classes in the fatherlands.12 
DuBois’s insight into the transmission of racism differs 
from Phelps’s: it is not that Austrians were redefined 
as Jews, Slavs, or Italians, but that Americans (as well as 
Europeans’ own colonial adventures) taught Europeans to 
perceive themselves primarily as “white,” to move beyond 
the differences between them and to imagine themselves 
superior to everyone who was not “white.” It remains to be 
seen how Phelps’s insight affects DuBois’s and how these 
different forms of racial orientation fed off or detracted 
from one another. 
The confusion about the false equivalencies of English 
words like race, nation, tribe, and people with German 
words like Rasse, Nation, Volksstamm, and Volk worked its 
way into not only the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, 
but also into the Minority Treaties that Lucien Wolf and 
others hoped would protect those left on the wrong side 
of Europe’s new “ethno-national” borders. This suggests 
the need to think about the role of U.S. racial categories 
in the tragic fate of Jews in interwar Austria who were 
denied citizenship because they could not prove they 
belonged to the German “race.”13  But there can be no 
presumption of direct causality or responsibility here. 
Phelps acknowledges that the discourse about racial and 
national identity included interlocutors from the British 
and French empires, but she stays true to her commitment 
to focusing on multiple dimensions of U.S.-Habsburg 
relations without being distracted by this incontrovertible 
fact. Taking up more thematically limited studies with a 
broader range of international actors would allow not only 
more investigation of the way that traditional imperialism 
contributed to this conversation, but also the way that 
antisemites’ increasing emphasis on the racial rather than 
the religious distinctiveness of Jews may have created 
a greater responsibility for some of this transition in 
Germany, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire itself.
Phelps has done a great service to both the fields 
she represents: Habsburg history and U.S. history. Few 
historians could claim to represent them both so well. This 
is a useful book, it is an interesting book, it is a provocative 
book. It opens fields of inquiry that transcend categorization 
and deserves to be recognized for its combination of care 
and courage.
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Author’s Response
Nicole M. Phelps
Many thanks to Andrew Johns for arranging this roundtable and to the scholars who contributed to it. With the book, I aimed to speak to historians 
working in a number of fields, and it is a pleasure to see 
responses from different types of historians brought 
together in one place.
Alison Johnson very kindly remarks that U.S.-Habsburg 
Relations “is not an irresponsible book,” and when quoting 
from it she often adds italics to highlight the specific word 
choices that give precision and nuance to my arguments. 
That nuance is important, because, as Benjamin Coates 
and Alan Sked point out, U.S.-Habsburg relations can 
only wield so much causal power. I argue that there are 
three important areas of conflict in the U.S.-Habsburg 
relationship: “diplomatic norms, a multitude of legal 
problems stemming from the migration of several million 
people back and forth between the two countries between 
the 1870s and World War I, and, of course, the crisis of the 
war itself.” I also argue that “these conflicts had a dramatic 
effect on both American and Habsburg political culture, 
and the clashes between their contrasting approaches to 
managing their diverse populations contributed decisively 
to the transition in international politics from the post-1815 
Great Power System to the post-1919 nation-state system. 
Their relationship demonstrates the international and 
transnational aspects of the construction of sovereignty” 
(2). 
Contrary to Sked’s reading, I explicitly state that “neither 
the American acceptance of Great Power diplomatic culture 
nor the increasing salience of racial-nationalist categories 
in the Habsburg Empire was produced exclusively by the 
U.S.-Habsburg relationship, but they were significantly 
influenced by that relationship” (7). I also say that U.S.-
Habsburg conflicts over diplomatic norms “helped to 
further” U.S. integration into the post-1815 Great Power 
System (4, emphasis added). Where I do make a claim about 
the uniqueness and indispensability of U.S.-Habsburg 
relations is in regard to their influence on the specific 
outcomes of the Paris treaties dealing with Central Europe 
at the end of World War I. Even there, I am not suggesting 
that the U.S.-Habsburg relationship was the only thing 
that mattered. However, it did matter a great deal, and we 
cannot fully understand the settlement without taking it 
into account.
In asserting that the book “is not about U.S.-Habsburg 
relations at all,” Sked raises the extremely important 
question of what constitutes legitimate objects of study 
for diplomatic historians. My understanding from Sked’s 
comments is that he would point to the highest level of 
activity—that among foreign ministers and secretaries of 
state, kings, prime ministers, and presidents—as the place 
where “diplomacy” happens and “policy” is created. In the 
study of modern European history and later U.S. history, 
that formulation can yield a great deal. For the United 
States in the long nineteenth century, however, it misses the 
vast majority of the action. Scholars are uncovering all sorts 
of activities undertaken by private American citizens that 
integrated them into a wider world and often required the 
reactive rather than proactive assistance of the state.1 
In my project, I opted for a middle ground. I generally 
restricted myself to what could be found in State Department 
and Foreign Ministry documents, so everything I looked 
at definitely had an element of official state involvement. 
Employees of the State Department and Habsburg Foreign 
Ministry in central offices and in the field generated 
thousands and thousands of documents. What are those 
documents evidence of, if not a relationship? (I suppose one 
thing they are evidence of is bad French: in the vein of U.S.-
Habsburg correspondence I drew from, the common usage 
was note verbalé, so I kept it. The correspondents also used 
despatch rather than dispatch, much to the dismay of one of 
my copyeditors.) Much of what is in those documents never 
made it to the White House, but that does not render the 
material unimportant or uninformative. Those documents 
allow us to see many things, including how everyday 
people interacted with the state. They also show us the 
steady accumulation of interactions that tied the U.S. and 
Habsburg governments together and shaped what actions 
were possible in times of crisis. This constructive approach 
to international relations lends itself well to integrating 
transnational and cultural approaches to diplomatic history 
with approaches centered on elite state actors. 
Benjamin Coates and Alison Johnson note that I take 
diplomatic ceremony and consular activity seriously, and 
that is definitely something I set out to do. When I began 
to research pre-World War I U.S.-Habsburg relations, I 
had little idea of what I would find, and I was very open 
to the idea that I might find evidence of only a “normal” 
relationship. But I saw my investigation as an opportunity 
to find out what “normal” was: how did two governments 
that were basically friendly interact, and, more important, 
why did they put in the time, money, and effort to 
maintain a relationship if they did not expect anything to 
come of it? In the book, I think I have shown the value of 
diplomatic ceremony for reinforcing legitimacy and the 
necessity of consular activities for exercising sovereignty 
and determining citizenship status. Consuls also, of 
course, dealt with trade matters, and Johnson provides a 
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fascinating glimpse into earlier Habsburg consular activity 
in this realm. I look forward to seeing more fruits of her 
research along those lines, and I very much hope that my 
work encourages the growing number of scholars who are 
investigating consular activity. The sources are there, and 
they are unquestionably rich. If we opt to dismiss them 
as merely administrative, we are letting an important 
opportunity pass us by.
Another of my primary goals with this project was to 
bring the reevaluation of the Habsburg Empire that has 
been underway for the past twenty-five years or so among 
Habsburg historians to the attention of the community of 
scholars engaged in diplomatic history and international 
relations. In that reevaluation, the Habsburg Empire 
is more viable—politically, economically, socially—
and less crowded with ethnic nationalists yearning for 
independence. Coates notes that I am generally sympathetic 
to the country, and that is definitely true in the sense that, 
both on the whole and relatively speaking, the Habsburg 
government was better at protecting individual rights than 
the U.S. government at the turn of the century. Neither 
was perfect! But I do think the idea of Habsburg success is 
helpful in getting people to rethink their assumptions and 
reevaluate their prior knowledge.
Part of the challenge comes from the name. What 
to call the Habsburg lands has long been a conundrum. 
Austria-Hungary works only from 1867, and even then, the 
official post-1867 name for “not Hungary” would not fit on 
a bumper sticker. The two common options among scholars 
are Habsburg Monarchy and Habsburg Empire. Both have 
problems: monarchy suggests that the ruler had more power 
than he actually did and that the country was more uniform 
than it was, while empire suggests a colonial relationship. 
Both monarchy and empire have negative connotations in 
U.S. culture, contributing to an image of the Habsburg 
lands as backward and unimportant. 
I have opted for empire, but I do not see the government 
as uniformly “imperial” in the sense that one might 
use the term when talking about, for example, British or 
American overseas colonies. This is another place where 
nuance is essential. After 1878, the Habsburg government 
administered Bosnia and Herzegovina, and people there 
had a different legal status. There is a growing body of 
literature on Habsburg policies in this region that engages 
with theories of empire and post-colonialism.2 In Hungary, 
there definitely were Magyarization efforts, and one might 
fruitfully consider those policies in light of work on settler 
colonialism in other areas of the world. For the Austrian 
part—where, ironically, the Habsburg ruler was styled 
as “emperor”—comparisons with other contemporary 
empires may be least appropriate; although the analogy 
is not perfect, the federalism of the United States is a 
closer match, as both countries mixed multiple levels of 
government and maintained significant local power and 
variation.
Coates is definitely correct that the post-1815 Great 
Power System applied one set of rules to European powers—
and, later, to the United States and Japan—and another to 
Africa and Asia. The Habsburg government was the power 
in the system with the fewest colonial aspirations, and from 
what I have seen, U.S.-Habsburg discussions contained 
nothing akin to the rhetoric of the “white man’s burden.” 
The word civilized was used frequently and was of course 
often wrapped up in a distinction between white and non-
white, but in U.S.-Habsburg conversations about Great 
Power norms, the participants did not take that further step 
to a specific invocation of race. 
Finally, I would like to address the critique about the 
nature of my book. I would definitely agree that it combines 
original archival research and synthesis, and perhaps the 
element of synthesis is more pronounced than one might 
expect in a book based on a Ph.D. dissertation. While some 
may consider synthesis “derivative,” I think it is important 
for several reasons. Obviously, the archival research is 
important, as it brings to light materials that had not 
previously been studied. I have also offered new readings 
of many of the more readily available primary sources. In 
building on existing secondary research, I am tying my 
archival findings and the U.S.-Habsburg relationship to 
conversations in a number of different historical subfields, 
which will, I hope, make the book useful not only to 
diplomatic historians, but to others as well, including those 
interested in migration and state-building. 
Most important, though, I believe my book fills a gap 
that may have impeded research on this topic. Many of 
the elements of the U.S.-Habsburg relationship have been 
presented in articles, but without some kind of broader map, 
it is difficult for authors to make claims for significance or 
even to acknowledge the context in which the events they 
are describing took place.3 My book provides that basic 
map, and I hope it helps prompt further research. With 
digitized newspapers and periodicals so much more easily 
accessible now than they were when I planned the scope 
of my study, there is much to explore in terms of American 
popular discourse on the Habsburg Empire and Habsburg 
discourse on the United States. I could suggest any number 
of topics, but consular efforts to promote trade and 
Habsburg—especially Hungarian—efforts to repatriate 
migrants and care for them after their return would be 
fruitful areas of investigation. And, as Johnson suggests, 
studies that focus on a particular theme in a shorter time 
span but with a broader range of actors would be most 
welcome. I believe my book demonstrates that the United 
States and the Habsburg Empire deserve a place alongside 
Britain, France, and Germany as we continue to explore 
international and transnational elements of the fin de siècle.
Notes:
1. See, among numerous other examples (including those listed 
by Benjamin Coates), Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and 
the Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge, UK, 2005); Kristin 
Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium: The Global Production of Ameri-
can Domesticity, 1865–1920 (Chapel Hill, 2007); and Robert E. May, 
Manifest Destiny’s Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America 
(Chapel Hill, 2002). 
2. Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch, and Moritz Csáky, eds., 
Habsburg Postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und kollecktives Gedächtnis 
(Innsbruck, 2003); see also Robin Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism: 
The Habsburg “Civilizing Mission” in Bosnia, 1878–1914 (Oxford, 
UK, 2007).
3. For a list of previous scholarship, see footnote 1 in the introduc-
tion to U.S.-Habsburg Relations.
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Call for Applications . . . 
Editor-in-Chief, SHAFR’s Guide to the Literature
 The Society for Historians of 
American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) 
published a magisterial, two-volume 
guide to the literature in the history of 
American foreign relations in 2003. 
Since 2007, the two paper volumes 
have been updated by the regular, on-
line publication of section updates.  
 SHAFR is now searching for a new 
editor-in-chief for the digital version of 
the Guide.  Duties will include recruiting 
section editors to provide regular 
updates of content, working with a 
commercial publisher or developing 
an on-line publishing platform to host 
content, and providing overall strategic 
management of the project.  
 The position will be compensated 
at the rate of $3,000 per year.  The 
successful applicant ideally will be 
appointed to a multi-year, renewable 
term.
 Applicants should submit a letter 
(2 pages maximum) and a c.v. The 
letter should explain the applicant’s 
academic and professional credentials 
that qualify her/him for the position and 
indicate the applicant’s objectives and/
or vision for the project.  All application 
materials should be sent to Peter L. 
Hahn, Executive Director of SHAFR, 
at shafr@osu.edu.  Questions should 
also be directed to Dr. Hahn.  Deadline 
for applications is May 15, 2014.  The 
SHAFR Council intends to make an 
appointment by July 1, 2014.
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A View From Overseas
 Filling the Empty Chair: France 
and the United States from 
Geneva
Jayita Sarkar
Geneva, which has been the center of international negotiations since the 1872 Alabama Arbitration, has been witness to many a diplomatic tussle, gaffe, 
impasse, and resolution. As European headquarters of 
the United Nations, this small Swiss city of under sixteen 
square kilometers has more peace accords and negotiations 
to its name than McDonald’s outlets. While it observed 
numerous clashes between the United States and the former 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, Geneva was also privy 
to probably the most significant rift within the Western 
bloc—that between Paris and Washington.
Throughout the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle’s “empty chair” 
policy—named after the French president’s decision in 
1965 to bring European Economic Community proceedings 
to a halt by recalling France’s representative to the EEC 
Council—spilled over to various platforms of international 
diplomacy, including the nuclear nonproliferation treaty 
negotiations in Geneva. The Franco-American differences 
that had prevailed throughout the Cold War then seemed 
to dissipate gradually. Yet disputes still occurred.  The 
P5+1 negotiations in Geneva on Iran’s nuclear program in 
November 2013 were a case in point: French insistence on 
a tougher stance on the Arak heavy water reactor nearly 
brought about a renewed deadlock between Tehran and 
the West.1 Apart from John McCain, who tweeted “Vive la 
France,” not many were amused by the French obstruction 
of the interim agreement.2 
Why has France so often proved to be such a hard case 
for U.S. foreign policy? American leaders usually pointed 
to de Gaulle as the source of their problems. In July 1963, 
U.S. Undersecretary of State George W. Ball alluded to 
General de Gaulle in a memo to President John F. Kennedy: 
“He cannot be bribed or persuaded by offers or concessions 
from pursuing the narrow nationalistic course. . . .  After 
all what can you do with a man who begins his Memoires 
by writing: ‘All my life I have thought of France in a certain 
way. This is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason.’”3 
De Gaulle remained a stumbling block in Franco-American 
relations for a large part of the Cold War. However, that 
was the case whether the General was at the helm in Paris 
or not.4 The persistence of such sentiments raises a simple 
yet pertinent question: Was it only a conflict of national 
interests that separated the two countries, or were their 
disagreements part of a larger clash based on historical 
misunderstandings? 
French historians pay more attention to the significance 
of Yalta than their American counterparts do; clearly, it was 
important to the postwar French psyche. 5  Seen through 
such a lens, it would appear that an Allied-liberated France 
began on the road to recovery on an unequal footing. 
It would be only natural, thus, that the French would be 
constantly wary of being trod upon by “greater powers.” 
Within a decade of Yalta, in 1954, the Geneva Accords 
had terminated the French role in Indochina, and the 
anticolonial movement had gained momentum in Algeria. 
The sun had only begun to set on the French Empire.
If the stigma of Yalta was not enough, the French also 
had a “Manhattan complex.” Feelings of inferiority emerged 
from France’s inability to participate in the Manhattan 
Project, the Allied wartime endeavor to build the world’s 
first atomic bombs, despite being at the forefront of nuclear 
fission research before the Second World War.6 Such feelings 
were exacerbated when, in April 1960, days after the second 
French nuclear test, U.S. Secretary of Defense Thomas 
Gates was quoted in the New York Times as saying that “the 
United States did not regard two nuclear explosions as 
qualification for French admission into the nuclear club.”7 
The aggressive French nuclear export policy and, in later 
years, the politique proliferatrice of the French atomic energy 
commission had a strong Gaullist cast, the nature of which 
was most evident in the mid-1970s disagreements over 
French commitment to nuclear nonproliferation between 
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and his prime minister, 
Jacques Chirac, who was the leader of the Gaullist faction in 
the Assemblée Nationale.
The Manhattan complex perhaps is comparable to the 
“Fashoda syndrome,” a pattern of behavior that is said 
to have emerged from feelings of battered pride after the 
French, embroiled in a contest with Britain for territory in 
Africa in 1898, had to back down and withdraw their forces 
from Fashoda in present-day South Sudan, leaving much 
of that region to the British. The term is most often used 
now to describe French interventions in Africa that are 
prompted by apprehensions of losing out to Anglophone 
encroachment.8 Thus, just as the Anglo-French rivalry 
of yesteryear transformed itself into French competition 
against the “Anglo-Saxons” after the Second World War, so 
the French insecurities that contribute to Franco-American 
differences probably have older roots. De Gaulle and 
Gaullism may make more sense in this light.
Last August, while calling for support for military 
intervention in Syria, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 
called France “our oldest ally,” thus invoking images of the 
Franco-American alliance against the British during the 
American War of Independence.9 The era of “freedom fries” 
seems to have passed with Jacques Chirac’s political exit, 
and the United States and France seem to be converging 
more and more on their foreign policy aims. The readiness 
of President François Hollande in the Syrian case is 
telling. Yet the Cold War era earned Paris the label of an 
unreliable ally. Certainly the legacy of Gaullism, together 
with differing interests in regions like the Middle East, 
may lead the two countries to disagree every now and 
then. However, the United States can improve its chances 
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of accord through a better understanding of the historical 
underpinnings of some French foreign policy positions. 
France has been more than willing to fill its empty chair 
at international platforms in Geneva and elsewhere over 
the past decade or so, and the climate may be just right to 
initiate a sustainable Franco-American entente. 
Notes: 
1. Louis Charbonneau and Yeganeh Torbati, “Iran nuclear deal 
unlikely as split emerges in Western camp: diplomats,” Reuters, 
November 9, 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/09/
us-iran-nuclear-idUSBRE9A804X20131109.  The P5 +1 nations 
are the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and 
France, plus Germany.
2. Corine Lesnes, “Nucléaire iranien: Le ‘Vive la France!’ des fau-
cons américains,” Le Monde, November 11, 2013, at http://www.
lemonde.fr/europe/article/2013/11/11/nucleaire-iranien-le-vive-
la-france-des-faucons-americai_3511652_3214.html. 
3. Memorandum for the President on Proposed Nuclear Offer to 
de Gaulle from George W. Ball to John F. Kennedy, 22 July 1963, 
Box 46, Folder 23, France, George W. Ball Papers, Princeton Uni-
versity Library, Princeton, NJ.
4. Marc Trachtenberg, “The De Gaulle Problem,” Journal of Cold 
War Studies 14, 1 (2012). See also Trachtenberg, “The French Factor 
in U.S. Foreign Policy During the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 1969–
1974,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, 1 (2011); and A Constructed 
Peace : The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963, Prince-
ton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, N.J., 
1999).
5. See Frédéric Bozo, La Politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945 
(Paris, 2012); Two Strategies for Europe : De Gaulle, the United States, 
and the Atlantic Alliance(Lanham, MD, 2001).
6. Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and Nation-
al Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA, 1998). For elabora-
tion of the concept of the “Manhattan complex” see Jayita Sarkar, 
“From the Peaceful Atom to the Peaceful Explosion: Indo-French 
Nuclear Relations During the Cold War, 1950–1974,” Nuclear Pro-
liferation International History Project Working Paper Series 3(2013).
7. Cited in Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the 
N+1 Country,” Foreign Affairs 39 (April 1961): 356.
8. See, for instance, Jean-François Leguil-Bayart, “Fin de par-
tie au sud du Sahara ? La politique africaine de la France” in S. 
Michaïlof, dir., La France et l’Afrique. Vade-mecum pour un nouveau 
voyage ( Paris, 1993), 112–29 and «Bis repetita: la politique afri-
caine de François Mitterrand de 1989 à 1995», in S. Cohen, dir., 
Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide (Paris, 1998), 251–86. 
(Coll. «Politique d’aujourd’hui»).
9. Peter Foster, “Syria: John Kerry slaps Britain in face as he calls 





Announcing a new site for SHAFR online 
 
A multi-year effort to create a dynamic new online presence for foreign relations history will culminate 
with the launch of SHAFR’s new website in July 2014.  SHAFR is working with Liefa Communications, a 
firm that has created award-winning designs such as the Gulag Exhibit for the Global Museum on 
Communism.  The site will be more than a location to find information about annual meetings and 
publications.  It will be a place for teachers to collaborate, and for researchers to share their ideas.  It will 
showcase SHAFR’s publications and programs.  It will be a place for scholars, policy-makers and the public 
to find resources and expert opinion on foreign relations history. 
 
Visit our booth at the SHAFR Annual Meeting for a preview of what’s to come.  Meet our web 
designers.  Find out the ways SHAFR’s new website can support your research and 
teaching.  Find out how you can help make this new site a success. 
 
Committee on SHAFR and the Web: Laura Belmonte, Mary Dudziak (chair), George 
Fujii (webmaster), Jacob Hamblin, Rebecca Herman and Chester Pach 
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Announcing the New Center for 
Presidential History at SMU
Jeffrey A. Engel
In 2013 Southern Methodist University became one of but a handful of schools to host a presidential library on its campus.  Housed inside the George W. Bush Presidential 
Center, the George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum 
opened on April 25, 2013, with President Obama and every 
living former president in attendance. The museum has 
shattered previous attendance records for a presidential 
site, a testament to the tumult and transformation of the 
Bush years, and archivists have begun the long process of 
making the Bush administration’s records, the lifeblood of 
historians, available to future researchers.  
Six months before this presidential hoopla, in 
November 2012, SMU opened a related center on campus, 
albeit to less fanfare: the Center for Presidential History (of 
which I am the founding director).  This center’s goals are 
no less ambitious: to further the study of the world’s most 
powerful office; to further the university’s aspiration to 
be recognized as a national-level research institution; and 
to help integrate the Bush Center and its in-house policy 
institute into the broader culture and milieu of campus life. 
Three missions underlie these goals. First, the CPH 
actively promotes scholarship on the presidency by SMU 
faculty and by scholars around the country through 
research grants, an ongoing and growing post-doctoral 
fellowship program, and promotion of campus and public 
lectures and visits by scholars studying the presidency. 
The center also coordinates conferences and symposia for 
historians to explore and discuss issues cooperatively.  To 
date more than thirty scholars have presented their work 
in such venues, including SHAFR members Bill Brands, 
Melvyn Leffler, Matthew Jones, Frank Costigliola, and 
William Hitchcock; and the CPH has coordinated three 
conferences: “The Four Freedoms: FDR’s Legacy of Liberty 
for the United States and the World,” “Faith in Obama’s 
America,” and “When Life Strikes the White House: Death, 
Scandal, Illness, and the Responsibilities of a President.” 
Oxford University Press will publish volumes from the 
first two of these events and Harvard University Press will 
publish a volume from the third, furthering the center’s 
second major mission: engagement with the public, both 
in Dallas and beyond, to meet its seemingly insatiable 
appetite for presidential history with work grounded in the 
latest scholarship.  
The CPH’s third mission is a gift to generations of 
scholars still to come. The center coordinates an active and 
expansive “Collective Memory Project” that is designed to 
capture and archive personal experiences during the Bush 
years.  Brian Franklin, previously of Texas A&M University, 
directs the Collective Memory Project, aided by in-house 
scholars Aaron Crawford (on leave as associate editor of 
the Ulysses S. Grant Papers) and William Steding (a recent 
graduate of University College-Cork) and national fellows 
Michael Nelson, Melvyn Leffler, Thomas DeFrank, and 
Sylvia Hoffert.
The goal of this broad-based oral history project is 
not only to record the reflections of Bush administration 
alumni—though that is a dominant part of the project—
but, more synthetically, to compile accounts of lives and 
events from the years George W. Bush held office. Similar 
oral history projects abound, some devoted to cataloguing 
memories from top administration officials, others 
dedicated to preserving the human experiences found 
in the stories of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. Ours differs in two ways. 
First, the Collective Memory Project seeks to answer key 
questions about the Bush years, such as the role of faith in 
the White House, the inside dynamics of the 2004 election, 
and the role of the First Lady’s Office in coordinating the 
president’s diplomatic schedule and thereby furthering 
his diplomatic agenda. Second, we go beyond the men and 
women who served the administration by interviewing 
their allies and opponents outside  government, journalists 
who covered the major events of the day, experts whose 
work influenced policy debates, and those whose lives 
were directly affected by decisions and policies whose 
development the public will in time be able to examine 
when documents currently in process at the Bush Library 
are released.  These interviews are preserved in video and 
transcript form, but will be withheld from public use for 
a minimum of ten years, time enough to allow subjects to 
feel free to speak to the historical record.  No one can say 
with certainty what questions future historians may wish 
to pose of the Bush years, but our goal is to provide material 
for historians perhaps not yet even born. 
These programs directly intersect with SHAFR’s 
mission to further understanding of American foreign 
relations, because the presidency and executive power 
feature, if not prominently then subtly, in the work and 
writings of most SHAFR members. Indeed, the center’s first 
faculty fellow, Thomas Knock of SMU, whose forthcoming 
study of George McGovern will be furthered by dedicated 
writing time provided by the center, is a long-time member 
of the organization. I am also a member, and like my 
fellow center leaders, I take an expansive view of the 
term “presidential history,” believing that anything that 
intersects in any small way with federal power and with 
the executive branch of the United States government falls 
within its domain. 
We encourage SHAFR members—and the historical 
community more broadly—to look to the Center for 
Presidential History as a possible venue for disseminating 
ideas and for furthering individual and collective projects. 
Our programs are expanding (in particular our two-year 
post-doctoral program, which will quadruple in size 
over the next two years), and we are ever eager to accept 
proposals and ideas for conferences, lectures, topics for the 
Collective Memory Project, and additional ways to help the 
scholars who help the nation and the world understand its 
most powerful political office. If you have an idea, give us 
a call.  Further information can be found at www.smu.edu/
cph.  
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Please plan to join old friends and new at the 2014 SHAFR annual 
meeting in Lexington, Kentucky, the Horse Capital of the World!
The 2014 conference will be held June 19-21 at the Hyatt Regency Lexington and 
the Lexington Convention Center. Nestled among the beautiful rolling hills of horse 
country, Lexington is serviced by Blue Grass Airport (LEX), which is just 15 minutes 
from downtown. Larger airports in Cincinnati and Louisville are about a 90-minute drive from 
Lexington.
HOTEL INFORMATION
The Hyatt Regency is attached to the Lexington Convention Center. Hotel amenities include a complimentary 
airport shuttle, a 24-hour fitness center, a heated indoor pool, and an outdoor sun deck. The SHAFR rate for 
reservations at the Hyatt Regency is $122/night single or double occupancy, plus 13.4% tax. You can visit the 
conference website, listed below, to book online, or call the hotel directly at 859-253-1234 and request the 
SHAFR rate.
Registration will be $80 standard or $30 student/adjunct faculty/K-12 teacher before June 1. After June 1 
registration fees increase to $105/$45. You can register for the conference online at our website, listed below.
WINE AND DINE
The Bluefire Bar and Grill in the Hyatt lobby is a full-service restaurant operating from 6:30 am to 10 pm daily. The 
bar is open from noon until 11 pm daily, and serves a late night menu until closing. You can grab a Starbuck’s to 
go at the bar all day until 11 pm. The bar area features several large flat-panel TVs and the staff has promised to 
broadcast World Cup games during the conference upon request!
The Shops at Lexington Center includes a food court featuring fast casual eateries like Cosí, Arby’s, and Subway, 
as well as Yesterday’s Bar and Grille, a full-service restaurant and bar open nightly until 1 am – another nearby 
spot to watch the World Cup.
There are also many restaurants, bars, and shops in downtown Lexington within close walking distance of the 
conference. You will find the following places in a three block by four block area just a short 10-15 minute walk 
from the Hyatt Regency and the Lexington Convention Center:
·	 Saul Good Restaurant and Pub, 123 North Broadway between Main and Short.
·	 Shakespeare & Co., 367 W. Short Street near Broadway.
·	 Table Three Ten, 310 W. Short Street near Mill. Focused on small plates and a local, seasonal menu.
·	 The Village Idiot, 307 W. Short between Broadway and Mill. Lexington’s first gastropub.
·	 Parlay Social, 257 W. Short between Mill and Market. Live music Thursday-Saturday nights.
·	 Goodfella’s Pizzeria, 110 N. Mill Street near Short Street.
·	 Wild Cat Saloon, 123 Cheapside between Main and Short, another place likely to have sporting events on 
the TV.
·	 Cheapside Bar and Grill, 131 Cheapside at West Short Street, features a large outdoor seating area and 
would be another good spot to catch World Cup broadcasts.
·	 McCarthy’s Irish Bar, 117 S. Upper between Vine and Main.
·	 Alfalfa, 141 East Main between Limestone and Martin Luther King Blvd. Focused on local food, 
vegetarian-friendly.
·	 Lexington Beerworks, a bit of a longer walk at 213 North Limestone between 2nd and 3rd Streets, but a 
good spot for craft beer lovers. Outdoor seating available.
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For those feeling a bit more adventurous, another popular area with an up-and-coming restaurant scene can be 
found along Jefferson Street, about a 15 minute walk from the Hyatt:
·	 Nick Ryan’s Saloon, 157 Jefferson Street between Short and 2nd, fun neighborhood feel.
·	 The Grey Goose, 170 Jefferson Street between Short and 2nd, popular for pizza.
·	 Enoteca, 191 Jefferson Street at 2nd. Wine bar.
·	 Lexington’s burgeoning food truck scene is known to congregate in this area on weekend evenings.
Both of the above districts are serviced by COLT, Lexington’s free downtown circulator service. COLT has two 
routes: the Blue Route, which operates 11:30 am – 2:30 pm Monday through Friday and Thursday, Friday and 
Saturday from 6:00 pm – 1:00 am, and the Green Route, which runs Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights from 
9:00 pm -3:00 am.
The 5/3 Bank Pavilion at Cheapside Park hosts Thursday Night Live, a free community event every Thursday 
from 4:30 – 8:00 pm featuring live music. Cheapside Park is also the site of the Lexington Farmers Market, open 
Saturdays from 7 am to 3 pm. Cheapside Park is located at Main Street between Upper and Mill Streets, a short 
walk from the Hyatt and the LCC.
HISTORY and CULTURE
You can’t visit Lexington without learning a little bit about its rich history in equestrian pursuits. Keeneland Race 
Course, which hosts world-class horse races every April and October, is a quick 15-minute drive from downtown 
Lexington and is open daily for self-guided tours. Kentucky Horse Park is a 1,200 acre state park and working 
horse farm. It is open daily for tours, horseback trail rides, pony rides, shows and competitions. The Smithsonian-
affiliated International Museum of the Horse is also on site.
Lexington has non-equine treasures to share, too. The Aviation Museum of Kentucky is located at Blue Grass 
Airport, and the Kentucky Military History Museum is a short drive away in Frankfort. Ashland, the Henry Clay 
Estate, and the Mary Todd Lincoln House are both within walking distance of the Hyatt Regency. Gratz Park is not 
just a park but a historic district comprised of many lovely 19th century homes. The Art Museum at the University 
of Kentucky includes many fine works by American and European artists as well as African and pre-Columbian 
artifacts. Camp Nelson Heritage Park, about 20 miles south of Lexington, is a National Historic Landmark and 
was a Union Army supply depot during the Civil War where more than 10,000 African American troops trained. 
And finally, what would a visit to Lexington be without a distillery tour? Town Branch Distillery is just a ten minute 
walk from the Lexington Convention Center, and distillery tours also include a peek at the brewery that produces 
Kentucky Ale and Kentucky Bourbon Barrel Ale.
If you are curious about Lexington, download the free downtown audio walking tour! Get the app, download the 
mp3 file, or watch a video of the tour at http://www.visitlex.com/audiotour/index.php.
SHAFR SOCIAL EVENT
This year’s social event will be held Friday evening at Buffalo Trace Distillery, the oldest continually operating 
distillery in the country and a recently designated National Historic Landmark. The distillery sits on 130 acres in 
the heart of bourbon country. The log cabin-style clubhouse was built by distillery employees during the Great 
Depression, and features a covered wraparound porch and access to the beautifully maintained grounds. We 
hope you will join us for a casual social event featuring picnic-style fare, complimentary beer and wine, bluegrass 
music, and, of course, a bourbon tasting. This will be a uniquely Kentucky experience!
 SHAFR CONFERENCE June 19-21, 2014
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RESEARCH OPPORTUNITES
If research is on your mind, the University of Kentucky Libraries are a rich resource featuring manuscripts, still 
photographs, video, and sound recordings related to Kentucky history. They also include several outstanding special 
collections, including:
·	 The Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History includes more than 8,000 oral history interviews on topics such as 
political history, Appalachia, the history of broadcasting, World War II, and Vietnam.
·	 The Public Policy Archives contains manuscript collections related to the history of Kentucky politics and 
government, including the papers of U.S. Senator and Vice President under Truman Alben W. Barkley, U.S. 
Senator John Sherman Cooper, who also served as the American ambassador to India and Nepal and East 
Germany, and U.S. Senator Walter D. Huddleston, a member of the Church Committee.
Visit libraries.uky.edu for more information.
Other local research venues include:
Berea College, Special Collections and Archives (859-985-3262), Berea, KY
http://www.berea.edu/hutchinslibrary/specialcollections/default.asp
Kentucky Historical Society, Special Collections and Library (502-564-1792), Frankfort, KY
http://history.ky.gov
Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives (502-564-8300), Frankfort, KY
http://kdla.ky.gov
Transylvania University Library, Special Collections (859-233-8225), Lexington, KY
http://www.transy.edu/academics/library.htm
The Filson Historical Society (502-635-5083), Louisville, KY
www.filsonhistorical.org
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Archives and Special Collections (502-897-4573), Louisville, KY
http://archives.sbts.edu
Eastern Kentucky University Libraries, Special Collections and Archives (859-622-1792), Richmond, KY
http://www.library-old.eku.edu/new/content/archives/archives_index.php
We hope you can join us in Lexington in June! Visit the conference website for up-to-date information on the program, 
conference logistics, and ticketing: http://www.shafr.org/conferences/annual/2014-annual-meeting/, “like” us on facebook 
at www.facebook.com/shafr, or follow us on twitter @SHAFRConference, #SHAFR2014. You may also contact the 
Conference Coordinator, Jennifer Walton, at conference@shafr.org.
SEE YOU IN LEXINGTON! 
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Where would British historians be today if Michael Gove, the Minister of State for Education, hadn’t recently accused Cambridge history professor 
Richard J. Evans (along with Captain Edmund Blackadder, 
the eponymous hero of the BBC comedy series) of corrupting 
British youth with their cynical views of the First World 
War?1 Sadly, for Americans, the anniversaries of that war 
are unlikely to produce a similar frisson of controversy, but 
on the other hand, Americans have had much to say about 
Woodrow Wilson. It was once routine to debate George W. 
Bush’s foreign policy debt to Wilsonianism.2 Even Glenn 
Beck weighed in on February 3, 2012, appearing on TV 
in military fatigues to commemorate the anniversary of 
Wilson’s death in 1924, calling him a “son of a bitch” who 
“tore our country apart.”3
Yet as John A. Thompson points out, historians do not 
agree on the meaning of Wilsonianism as a “historical 
commitment”: is it about promoting democracy or 
international law or collective security or all three, even 
when they contradict each other? The protean character 
of the term has allowed Wilson to be appropriated (and 
scorned) by all parts of the ideological spectrum.4 I do not 
wish to use these pages for this particular debate. My aims 
are more modest: I want to take stock of the state of the 
field on the question of why the United States entered the 
European war in April 1917— a decision that set in motion 
all the subsequent puzzles of what would be Wilsonianism. 
The readers of Passport will be familiar with the outlines of 
this literature.5 But I would like to follow conventions and 
divide it into periods that I think reflect the internal logic of 
each phase of debate but also show the kinds of ideological 
forces that affected the way historians interpreted both 
their subject and their methods. 
The first phase of American writing about the U.S. 
intervention in the Great War was dominated by a 
“revisionist” controversy that called into question the 
real motives for belligerency. In 1914, most American 
intellectuals were appalled at how easily academics in 
Europe sold themselves to their governments; by 1917 
few Americans could resist their own call to duty, despite 
their training in German universities and their official 
commitment to objectivity.6 A number of historians worked 
on behalf of the government’s propaganda efforts: Albert 
Bushnell Hart, George Lincoln Burr, and James T. Shotwell 
were only the most well known. George Creel claimed he 
could recruit 2,500 historians to work for his Committee on 
Public Information.7 
This consensus was ruined by the ensuing argument 
over German “war guilt.” As the belligerents “rushed their 
own versions of the war into print,” Smith College historian 
Sidney Fay took the first cut in 1920–21 and subtly shifted 
responsibility away from Germany and toward Russia, 
or at least the structure of the international system itself.8 
The implications of this reappraisal for judging American 
participation were not immediately clear. Yale professor 
Charles Seymour turned out a short pro-Wilson history in 
1921,9 but most of the public discussion was conducted by 
embittered liberals such as journalist Albert Jay Nock and 
his publisher, John Kenneth Turner. In 1922, they offered the 
treasonable view that Germany was the least guilty party in 
the war.10 If that was the case, American intervention and 
the Treaty of Versailles were twin abominations. So why had 
the United States entered the war (even as it was publicly 
proclaiming its noble aims)? In the revisionists’ view, some 
combination of financial interests and Anglophile advisors 
drew Wilson into the war, which ended in a victory that 
restored the forces of reaction in Europe and crushed 
American democracy in the process. There was no moment 
of betrayal at Paris, only the logical unfolding of what came 
before.11
The revisionist controversy came to a head in 1926 with 
Harry Elmer Barnes’s The Genesis of the World War. Barnes 
better captured the postwar animus of ex-progressives.12 
Although his argument was about “war guilt,” not U.S. 
intervention, the two were linked; and freelance writer 
Hartley Grattan, one of Barnes’ former students, finally 
connected the dots. His Why We Fought (1929) stripped 
American intervention of any fig leaf of moral purpose.13
Revisionism became the dominant strain of American 
thinking in the 1930s. It was a broad tent, though, and 
while the progressive left predominated, there were 
various strains of conservatism within it.14 The revisionists 
were attacked, of course, by Wilson’s defenders in the 
1930s, notably by Seymour.15 His argument would come 
to be known simply as the “submarine thesis,” because he 
asked the simple question: would the United States have 
gone to war if there had been no submarine warfare? To 
him the answer was self-evident; but revisionists answered 
that pro-Entente interests in the United States had forced the 
Germans into submarine warfare first; even if submarines 
were a technical casus belli, the United States had been 
“intervening” in the war since 1914 and only got caught in 
1917.
By the mid-1930s this quarrel was taking place against 
the backdrop of another possible war in Europe. It was 
thus hard to tell whether the positions taken in the debate 
were actually about 1917 at all.16 The two most influential 
books to emerge were Walter Millis’s Road to War  (1935) 
and Charles Beard’s The Devil Theory of War (1936). Millis 
was a columnist for the New York Herald Tribune. He wrote 
that, while American intervention in 1917 may not have 
been a mistake, it was clear that Wilson had been cornered 
by a fatal combination of unscrupulous economic interests, 
Anglophile advisors, and submarine warfare.17 His book 
was widley used as the basis for the Neutrality Acts and the 
Nye Commission, making historians front-line players in 
foreign policy. For those who wished to keep the Wilsonian 
flame alive at the outset of the Second World War, the 
promotion of this view was hardly good news.18 
Beard’s slim book was more complex.19 He rejected the 
conspiratorial view of intervention but made much of a 
March 5, 1917 memo from Wilson’s pro-British ambassador 
in London, Walter Hines Page, on the desperate position 
of Anglo-French finances. The memo was proof that U.S. 
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interests involved more than submarines; the administration 
feared an American economic collapse should the Entente 
capitulate. Beard needed no cabal of financiers in his 
version of events, because loans to the British and French 
sustained the consumption of U.S. goods that was keeping 
the economy afloat.20 Beard’s sense was that the forces that 
led to belligerency amounted to little more than a desire 
on the part of American politicians to avoid facing up to a 
domestic economic crisis. 
The Second World War shifted the national mood 
against any of the arguments that sustained prewar 
isolationism and toward those positions resolutely 
supportive of American intervention. Walter Lippmann 
argued in 1941, before Pearl Harbor, that the United States 
had always had a “security” interest in the European balance 
of power.21 This new “realism” was still accompanied by 
conflicting interpretations of the decision to intervene in 
1917. Lippmann insisted that Wilson was not the naïve 
crusader his critics charged; he understood that the real 
reason to go to war was to defend the balance of power 
against German hegemony. On the other hand, Edward M. 
Earle, George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Robert E. 
Osgood started in the late 1940s to argue in classical realist 
terms that Wilson pursued the right policy (containing 
Germany) but for the wrong reasons (moralistic reform 
of an unreformable system). Osgood thought Wilson’s 
altruistic impulses had “but a tenuous relation to broad and 
enduring national policy.”22
Realism emerged against the backdrop of partisan 
debates over the Marshall Plan, membership in NATO, 
and whether a new American internationalism meant a 
more or less permanent American presence in Europe. It 
was, in other words, an intervention against the specter of 
neo-isolationism and the universalist rhetoric that had crept 
into Harry Truman’s internationalism. Historians were 
a bit more cautious about reinterpreting 1917: the Second 
World War may have made the German threat obvious to 
Americans, but whether they saw Prussian militarism in 
precisely the same way they saw Nazi (or Soviet) hegemony 
was another question.
At the height of the 1951 “Great Debate” over Truman’s 
decision to send U.S. soldiers to be part of a NATO command, 
Selig Adler offered a historical critique of the revisionist 
school’s emergence in the 1920s. American intellectuals, he 
believed, had been swayed by the self-criticism of British 
and French liberals and socialists (Marx’s grandson, Jean 
Longuet, among them). He attributed their repudiation of 
American values and standards to the zeitgeist of the Jazz 
Age, Freudianism, behavioral psychology and the like. He 
also noted that most of the revisionists were “amateurs” 
rather than professional historians (not true of Barnes or 
Beard, of course). American interwar isolationism should 
therefore be blamed on the distemper of the left and on 
shoddy scholarship. It was a cautionary tale for the 1950s.
The Cold War saw a growing interest in Wilson that 
culminated in 1956, the centennial of his birth. Arthur 
S. Link’s massive five-volume biography of Wilson was 
started in 1947 and finished in 1965. Link’s position 
on intervention began in a realist mode,23 but he soon 
became more sympathetic to Wilson’s ideals and credited 
them with a form of “higher realism” all their own. The 
Cold War demanded strategic sobriety from Americans, 
but the dramatization of the ideological chasm between 
communism and capitalism also required a restatement of 
the principles worth fighting for. 
Link was certainly the leader of this interpretive trek. 
His brief book, Wilson the Diplomatist (1957), argued that the 
president was neither dreamy nor indifferent to a German 
victory but rather linked the desire for a permanent reform 
of the international order to his perception that Germany, 
more than the Entente powers, was the state most likely 
to impede this reform. Ideologically, which side won the 
war did matter.24 Similarly, Edward H. Beuhrig and Ernest 
May created a more complex picture of Wilson’s foreign 
policy apparatus, as did Daniel M. Smith in his study of 
Robert Lansing.25 On the question of neutrality, May saw 
that while “moral” factors played a part in foreign policy 
decisions, the response to the British differed from the 
response to the Germans because of national interest: 
namely, trade.26 Wilson delayed intervention partly because 
he hoped the war might end first (and on terms that would 
obviate the need to endanger the fragile progressive 
American nation-state with mobilization), partly because 
he knew U.S. opinion was dangerously divided, and partly 
because he still hoped he might act as peacemaker. But he 
knew where America’s interests lay. The very security of 
the United States rested on constructing a particular form 
of international economic order that was more compatible 
with some types of states than others.27
May’s multi-national history paralleled Arno Mayer’s 
Political Origins of the New Diplomacy (1959). While Mayer’s 
book dealt mostly with wartime decision-making, it 
connected the war to the currents of unrest that threatened 
to sweep away the old order.28 Although the deterministic 
account of Innenpolitik could be overblown, as it was, 
for example, in Fritz Fischer’s 1961 account of German 
war aims, Mayer brought attention to the idea that the 
“national interest” was contested by different ideological 
communities in each nation, communities that also had ties 
to each other. Mayer showed that Wilson’s appropriation of 
non-annexationist “new diplomacy” came from the “parties 
of movement” in Europe rather than his pious American 
roots. The new diplomacy was a transnational program of 
the progressive left.
Mayer’s work dovetailed with other New Left histories 
that followed the publication of William Appleman 
Williams’s The Tragedy of American Diplomacy in 1959. The 
new social movements of the 1960s eventually opened up 
breathing space for new accounts of American foreign 
relations. If some of them were clumsy and reductionist, 
others were innovative and filled critical gaps. There 
was more attention given to peace movements and war 
resistance, which in turn allowed scholars to see how anti-
militarism at home kept Wilson wary of intervention.29 It 
was, however, N. Gordon Levin’s Bancroft award-winning 
Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (1968) that had the most 
impact. His book was a deft blend of Williams, Mayer, 
and Louis Hartz that saw Wilson positioning the United 
States as the defender of the liberal via media between 
“autocratic imperialism and revolutionary socialism.” 
Levin’s rejection of the realist-idealist dichotomy was 
also provocative: Wilson, he said, had “ideals” that tied 
constitutionalism to the expansion of capitalism and to 
American exceptionalism, but he pursued these because 
he understood that the European order stood on a knife’s 
edge between a conservative restoration and a radical anti-
capitalist alternative.30
The role of capitalism posed a challenge for historians 
with no affinity for the New Left. In 1971, Ross Gregory 
voiced something of a rough consensus that “national need 
and interests were such that it was nearly impossible to 
avoid the problems which led the nation into war.”31 That 
economic dependence cut both ways, and no doubt Wilson 
hoped it might make the British more receptive to his 
efforts at mediation. John M. Cooper’s look at the House-
Grey memorandum from London’s side showed how 
the financial desperation of the British led Lord Grey to 
seriously consider Wilson’s mediation. Only preparations 
for the Somme offensive and fears of appearing weak 
prevented the Cabinet from acting.32 But a clearer picture 
of the private-public dynamic in American neutrality 
policies was finally emerging. Cooper, again, showed that 
when the British and French went to the United States in 
September 1915 to procure a loan, they found American 
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bankers balking. When the newly created Federal Reserve 
eased traditional restrictions on overseas loans (there was 
some internal dissent), Secretary of the Treasury William 
McAdoo told Wilson that financing Europe’s purchasing 
power was indispensable to the U.S. economy. In the 
summer of 1916, the easing of German submarine warfare, 
the Irish uprising, and British seizure of U.S. ships made the 
American public increasingly hostile to the UK. The British 
contemplated reprisals, but their own dependence on 
American goods made that impossible. Keynes predicted 
that by 1917 the United States would be able to dictate 
terms to London. The collapse of the British economy was 
postponed by American belligerency, but it was, as the 
Duke of Wellington said of Waterloo, a near run thing.33
Roberta Dayer’s study of the House of Morgan’s 
relationship with the Wilson administration showed just 
how fraught the Federal Reserve’s position was: it knew 
it had an obligation to warn markets about risky loans to 
the Entente, yet it also knew that the U.S. economy needed 
the transatlantic trade the loans fueled. Dayer’s point was 
that by 1916 the Fed was aware that only the United States 
had the power to shorten or prolong the war. The country 
could not detach itself from the outcome because whatever 
it decided to do would determine the course of the war.34
But could Wilson have pursued a different policy? And 
how much of the decision rested solely in the hands of the 
idiosyncratic president? British jurist Patrick Devlin wrote 
an elegant and popular history of U.S. neutrality in which 
he meekly concluded that Wilson went to war because he 
decided to do so, even though Wilson complained that in the 
end he thought he had no choice.35 Devlin did not, in other 
words, ask how agency worked under those conditions: 
was Wilson constrained by circumstances, and if so, was 
causation not fed through them? Or did the president erase 
his sense of choice as a pretext for concealing his own 
unarticulated motives? Can historians tell the difference, 
let alone weigh the alternatives in a balance against the 
structures of meaning in which Wilson operated?
At least evidence was no longer a problem. Thanks 
to Arthur Link’s herculean labors, the Papers of Woodrow 
Wilson that dealt with the neutrality period were published 
in the early 1980s: volume 30 (1914) in 1979 and volume 42 
(early 1917) in 1983. Much of what followed in the decade, 
though, remained in well-trod paths. John Coogan blamed 
Wilson’s biased neutrality on his Anglophilia.36 William 
Becker affirmed the centrality of U.S. anxieties about a 
German victory but assigned credit (or blame) to Lansing for 
defining the threat in terms of the moral conflict between 
autocracy and democracy.37 Kathleen Burk gave us a full 
archival history of the transatlantic financial relationship.38 
Realists resumed their commitment to denying Wilson’s 
realism.39 And on the left, Lloyd Gardner posited that the 
ideational content of the New Diplomacy was not ordained 
by Wilson’s earlier ideas but by an improvisational 
reconciliation of his liberal anxieties with the challenge 
posed by Bolshevism.40
To my mind, the most innovative works on this period 
were those that attempted to grasp the over-determined 
and fluid nature of decision-making.41 The context in which 
some ideas about national security had more social traction 
than others was explored in Michael Pearlman’s To Make 
Democracy Safe for America (1984).42 Pearlman looked at the 
growth of U.S. military preparedness from the War of 1898 
to the New Deal, showing how conservatives in U.S. society 
believed that military preparedness would inoculate 
American society against radicalism. One could of course 
phrase this in terms of concepts of manliness, inter alia, 
but also in terms of Richard Hofstadter’s idea of “cultural 
politics”: Mugwump America pined for a unified and 
homogenous national culture. For many people, anxiety 
about the moral temptations of materialism was reversible 
only through the spirit of duty found in martial trial.43
John A. Thompson’s parsing of the heterogeneous 
commitments of progressive publicists showed a 
spectrum of social beliefs that explained the fracturing of 
progressivism during the war but also helped illustrate 
why so many of them—even radicals—came to provide 
critical domestic support for Wilson in 1916–17.44 The “war 
liberals” were armed with a reform vocabulary for Wilson’s 
tilt toward belligerency and helped persuade the left wing 
of the progressives to support the decision. Walter Weyl 
joked that American peace plans were based on “cornfed, 
tepid idealism,” which nonetheless was the raw material 
of national greatness.45 Thompson also tempered but did 
not wholly abandon Christopher Lasch’s earlier view 
that progressives were attracted to belligerency by the 
opportunity for “mastery” that it offered, a rejuvenating 
will-to-power that appeared in their arguments. Roosevelt’s 
was perhaps the most extreme version of the idea that the 
war could serve as an antidote to American softness, but 
traces of it, in less overtly masculinized form, could be 
found in the New Republic and elsewhere.
All of this is to say that social and cultural history were 
slowly shedding light on the entanglement of meaning with 
material life, forcing a number of historians to reconsider 
how to understand international history. The cultural 
turn would not be embraced by all diplomatic historians, 
by any means, but methodological challenges since the 
1960s were producing casualties. Thompson had come to 
believe that the realist-idealist dichotomy, a descendant 
of the overcharged rhetoric that emerged from European 
intellectuals during the peace process, was dead and buried. 
He was more attracted to Buehrig’s idea that Wilson’s 
policies were reactive and that the grand ideas attributed to 
him and judged to be somehow metaphysically preordained 
were borrowed, provisional, or developed with imperfect 
knowledge of the world. Thompson summed it up this way: 
Wilson was driven by the need to reconcile the internal 
forces of pluralism in America with the pressures exerted 
by the war and by the way the war posed real challenges to 
the continuation of the American way of life.46 
This complex view of Wilson was lost in the 
triumphalism of the Cold War. The 1990s may have been 
a decade of foreign policy uncertainty, but they generated 
overly schematic interest in Wilson’s internationalism. 
This was, after all, the age of “democratic peace theory.”47 
Ironically, Lloyd Ambrosius, the most rigorous realist critic 
of Wilson, opened the decade with a dismissive brief on 
liberal internationalism that juxtaposed the president’s 
intolerant universalism with the pluralist reality of the 
world.48 To this, one of Link’s students, Thomas Knock, had 
a ready reply: none other than George Kennan himself, 
Knock reported in 1991, described Wilson as “ahead of his 
time.”49 Knock then produced the most important study of 
the decade, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for 
a New World Order (1992). He placed Wilson’s foreign policy 
less in the exigencies of the war, less still in a realist/idealist 
struggle, and more in the Progressive Era’s “search for 
order.” The rhetoric of mission was neither new nor unique, 
and so Knock looked for the development of Wilson’s ideas 
in the cleavages of progressive politics and in his courtship 
of the liberal left after 1914. It was from them that Wilson 
acquired his “progressive internationalism,” a theory that 
connected interstate peace to social justice and industrial 
democracy.50 
This idea was in fact a revival of a notion from the 1960s: 
that values in some sense constituted material interests. Enter 
Frank Ninkovich’s two books, Modernity and Power (1994) 
and The Wilsonian Century (1999).51 Ninkovich audaciously 
described Wilson as an anxious modernizer who struggled 
against the “normal internationalism” of the nineteenth 
century. “As the war’s dangers became clear, Wilson closed 
the gap between self-interest and selflessness by tying his 
supranationalism closely to the imperative of survival.”52 
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Ninkovich anchored this argument in a rejection of the idea 
that material security and national ideational values are 
ontologically different. Ideologies are not epiphenomenal 
but are the very stuff that gives meaning to materiality. 
This interpretation made Wilson both more important and 
more prophetic.
The lauding of liberal internationalism—all very 
fin-de-la-guerre-froide—was probably too hasty, but its 
theoretical reorientation toward transatlantic histories of 
what Daniel Rodgers called progressive “social politics” 
was overdue. Some of that potential was derailed again 
by debates over American empire in the aftermath of 
9/11. The turn of the century had softened the teleological 
certainty of democratic peace theory, but there was still 
more disputation about what Wilsonianism really meant. 
Most of it was quite partisan and had little new to say about 
the decision to bring the United States into the First World 
War.53 
The disillusionment some Americans felt about the 
Bush administration’s open-ended conception of globalism 
may have contributed to a rejuvenation of the realists. Since 
2007, three new studies of American neutrality policy were 
published, two by self-identified realists. Robert W. Tucker’s 
Wilson and the Great War (2007) argued that America’s 
neutrality policy was flawed because of Wilson’s particular 
design of it, not because of German policy.54 Ironically, this 
was a position that could have given support to the old 
revisionists. In 2007, political scientist Benjamin O. Fordham 
reexamined America’s export trade and congressional 
voting patterns during the war and, in a conclusion that 
was consistent with liberal interdependence theory, 
declared that economic ties shaped American politicians’ 
views of the war, just as they drove the Germans toward 
submarine warfare.55 
Ross Kennedy emerged as a new voice in the field with 
an important essay in 2001 and a monograph in 2009 that 
showed the influence of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism.56 
Kennedy agreed that Wilson was “realistic” enough to 
recognize Germany as a security menace to the United 
States, but because the president thought the answer was 
to remove structural anarchy, he articulated unrealistic 
war aims that were doomed to failure and set in motion an 
commitment to globalism that produced the very militarism 
at home that he and his allies wanted to avoid.57 In his 
2009 book, Kennedy identified three different tendencies 
dominating American thinking: liberal internationalism, 
Atlanticism, and pacifism. (Thompson developed a similar 
classification earlier; so did Priscilla Roberts, in a series of 
articles written between 1997 and 2005.)58 Kennedy believed 
Wilson’s justification for engagement in Europe was an 
unsustainable paradox: he felt that the United States had 
to use power politics to end power politics. True enough, 
but the paradox created by the realist security dilemma 
(in which the pursuit of security by one nation or group 
of nations undermines everyone’s security) was equally 
insurmountable. Kennedy may also have overstated 
the divisions among internationalists, Atlanticists, and 
pacifists. One has only to look at Christopher Nichols’s 
intellectual history of the “isolationism” at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, which was a veritable histoire 
croisée of different ways to conceive of internationalism and 
isolationism.59 
One could also challenge the degree to which Wilson 
had a coherent vision of a new diplomacy to replace the 
old. If he was critical of the balance of power, he merely 
shared the opinion of most Americans at the time.60 Here 
again Thompson’s cautionary account of Wilsonianism 
as a “conflicted concept” should remind us of how much 
of Wilson’s policy was ad hoc and in need of proper 
historicizing. And how much it drew on non-American 
sources. If I fault Kennedy for anything, it is the extent to 
which his survey is grounded in the view from the White 
House, a tendency that reinforces the exceptionalism he 
faults in Wilson.
In 2011, Justus Doenecke, one of the best-known 
historians of mid-century American anti-interventionism 
and another student of Link’s, promised a “new history of 
American entry into World War I.” Giving deep attention 
to public opinion and creating rich profiles of key decision-
makers, Doenecke’s book repeats the anti-realist position 
that Wilson’s insulated mind roughly reflected American 
opinion.61 
So where are we now? There is, thankfully in my view, 
no final consensus on the causes of American intervention. 
Realists, liberals, and radicals continue to disagree, 
even if we have a richer empirical foundation for that 
disagreement. The reasons for these divisions are not hard 
to fathom. Aside from the diverse ideological commitments 
we take to our reading of documents, the meaning of past 
events is invariably filtered through the question of “what 
happened next.” We intuitively engage in a genealogical 
(even idolatrous) quest for the origins of our present 
condition, and as that condition changes, our genealogy 
takes different shapes.
I would, however, like to offer these two broad 
observations that engage what I think is the main theoretical 
architecture of this literature and the ways in which, 
perhaps, its foundations can be more explicitly debated.
Culture, Psychology, and Unspoken Assumptions
The literature on American intervention has not, to 
my mind, fully explored the possibilities of James Joll’s 
discussion of the “unspoken assumptions” of 1914.62 With 
some important exceptions (I would include Beard, May, 
Mayer, Levin, Thompson, and Ninkovich), the debates here 
have been traditional in method—driven by the normative 
impulse to try to locate American foreign policy in a single 
tradition that stems from or rebels against Wilson. This 
ideological investment in the meaning of intervention as 
a kind of instruction for future citizens and policymakers 
naturally lends itself to narrative history as well as to 
judgments about individual leaders (to retain the virtues of 
agency) and lessons to be learned. There are always traces 
of nationalist commitment in such efforts, which makes a 
transnational or post-national history harder to articulate. 
The literature also tends toward a de-historicized 
account of the era. We need to trace carefully how this 
era was structured by normalized (and transnational) 
assumptions about racial hierarchy, civilization, progress, 
order, science, and manliness.63 It is not that these ideas 
were hidden or unspoken, but we don’t yet know how 
to make them causative in understanding international 
politics, even though it is precisely the instinctive, taken-
for-granted, assumptions about reality that make all the 
difference to behavior. The history of Wilson’s foreign policy, 
for example, has been notably silent on the structuring role 
of gender. A number of works talk about romanticism, 
strength, or honor but manage to avoid locating these 
in the sexual binaries of the age. Such binaries were 
everywhere, so common, indeed so normal, that many 
historians continue to believe that the absence of women 
in international affairs is actually proof of the irrelevance 
of gender rather than gender par excellence. Yet in one of his 
1971 essays, Arthur Link furiously rejected (and rightly so) 
the Freud-Bullitt psychological biography that described 
Wilson as “undersexed” and characterized by “feminine 
passivity.” Link’s apoplectic reply was that “Wilson was 
in fact extremely virile . . . [his] sexual drive was probably 
primarily responsible for his tremendous inner drive and 
burning intensity.”64 One hardly knows where to begin 
with this gem, but clearly, even for so detached a scholar 
as Link, the relationship between masculinity and idealism 
was a subject of grave concern. The suggestion that Wilson 
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was anything less than virile was a charge that had to be 
answered. Why it had to be answered was another one of 
those unspoken assumptions.
The word “honor” was also frequently invoked, of 
course, by partisans in the pre-intervention debate, but 
its heuristic meaning has been insufficiently studied by 
American historians. It had, at the time, clear links to the 
fluid standards of manliness and masculinity. A little text-
mining of Wilson’s statements would likely reveal a fairly 
steady diet of references to self-control. On August 3, 1914, 
for example, while his wife was dying, Wilson told the press 
that he wanted “to have the pride of feeling that America, 
if nobody else, has her self-possession.”65 His August 19, 
1914 message to Congress urging impartiality spoke of 
the “fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of 
self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action.”66 In 
speaking to the Associated Press after the March 28, 1915 
sinking of the Falaba, he said that he was     “interested in 
neutrality because there is something so much greater to do 
than fight; there is a distinction waiting for this Nation that 
no nation has ever got. That is the distinction of absolute 
self-control and self-mastery.”67 Self-possession was one of 
Wilson’s favorite character traits, and it carried with it a 
conception of manhood that he wished to see incorporated 
into America’s global image.
More could be done along these lines, then, to deepen 
our understanding of both culture (collective meaning) and 
cognitive psychology (individual meaning). Seven years 
ago, Samuel Williamson and Ernest May wrote a brilliant 
survey of the field on the origins of the Great War.68 
In it they suggested that the work of economist Daniel 
Kahneman on heuristics and “intuitive judgment” could 
be especially valuable to historians trying to make sense of 
the July Crisis. Kahneman showed that even experts make 
judgments according to preassigned categories, exhibiting 
a preference for internal consistency over real assessments 
of probability. As an example, he quantified the marked 
preferences of leaders for hawkishness over conciliation.69 
If we apply this insight to collective meaning, we might 
ask how the broader cultural rules stemming from the 
particular power distributions of race, class, and gender 
produce social rewards for types of behavior specific to 
those meanings. It might then be possible to draw a clearer 
line between the unspoken assumptions of a given society 
at a given time and the contingent range of choices available 
to decision-makers.
International and Transnational Histories
The most compelling histories, to my mind, have been 
those that show the role played by socio-political forces 
within the nation-state and the way leaders defined the 
national interest in light of those forces. The literature on the 
outbreak of the First World War has long debated the role 
of those forces and arrived at no conclusive agreement.70 
But the difference between studies that look at the distant 
forces pointing inchoately toward conflict (determinism/
structure) and those that prefer testing the indeterminacy 
of decision-makers in the heat of crisis (contingency/
agency) is not an empirical problem: it is a theoretical one 
about the very nature of how we define the word “cause” 
and how we understand the individual’s sense of choice in 
a constantly shifting stream of consciousness. 
Yet settling this question helps point toward what 
we will define as our research horizons. The relationship 
between the social forces of the industrial transatlantic 
and the “search for order” found in all of the belligerents 
is, by its nature, diffuse, complex, and imprecise as a line 
of causation. It is also dialogic: Americans watched and 
evaluated their own society along with the socio-political 
landscape of others to assess America’s interest in what 
might be happening elsewhere. Business elites, radical 
progressives, pacifist feminists, socialists, missionaries, 
union leaders, and even artists had their own transatlantic 
networks that, at times, compelled them to identify with 
forces outside their own nation. More work is needed to 
understand the American debate in these transnational 
terms and to integrate them into the question of how 
American politics produced the ideas about the world that 
it did. 
Jay Winter and Antoine Prost’s historiography of the 
Great War contained some useful perspectives on the issue 
of unspoken assumptions and these wider socio-cultural 
contexts that eroded the solidity of the nation-state as a 
unitary actor. They recapitulated Mayer’s argument that 
the prewar era was characterized by an intensification of 
“internal conflict” in all the belligerents. While war was 
sometimes seen as a way of overcoming these tensions, 
there were also understood risks and uncertainties. I would 
argue that to minimize such risks meant that the forces of 
order (social patriotism) had an interest in cultivating a 
spirit of nationalism that in the end made sliding into war 
easier. Once the war was joined, the economic requirements 
of sacrifice and unity further entrenched the parties of 
order and destroyed groups like the Second International. 
When the war reached a critical stage in 1917, “it developed 
precisely those political forces which favored public control 
of foreign policy and a peace settlement founded on liberal 
principles and not pure force. . . .  [State leaders] had to 
take account of public opinion in order to preserve the 
social truce necessary for a war which demanded so many 
sacrifices.”71
It was at this moment that the U.S. entrance into the war 
took on so much significance, because Wilson’s insistence 
that war aims be clarified as a part of the U.S. entry emerged at 
the moment of crisis in which the old diplomacy (with elites 
defining the national interest and demonstrating it through 
the will to power and secret diplomacy) was being attacked 
from within. In my view, the realist account is weakest 
on this question. Because they viewed power politics as 
a timeless, invariant feature of international affairs rather 
than a historically contingent one (what Alexander Wendt 
would call one of many “cultures of anarchy”),72 the realists 
imagined, like some Metternichean ghost, that resistance to 
this democratization could somehow be sustained without 
consequences for what Americans defined as the national 
interest. Mayer in particular made the case that diplomatic 
history had to be understood as a dialectic between inside 
and outside; that the real issue of the war was not German 
war guilt but the forces of revolution and counter-revolution 
that had been building in the late nineteenth century and 
were unleashed by the demands and the violence of the 
war. Situating American intervention in the confluence of 
these transnational streams of social conflict would, I think, 
help us better understand the meaning of Wilsonianism.
The author would like to thank Brian Foster for his perceptive 
reading of a draft of this essay.
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Energy Crisis of the 1970s:  
Two FRUS Reviews
David S. Painter and Christopher R.W. Dietrich
The End of the Postwar Petroleum Order: A Review of 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. 
XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969–1974
 David S. Painter
The period covered by this volume witnessed significant changes in the world oil economy.1 The sharp rise in the price of oil in international markets 
from $1.80 per barrel in 1969 to $11.65 a barrel in 1974 
(prices in current dollars) was the most noticeable change, 
but three other related changes were equally if not more 
important. First, the disappearance of spare productive 
capacity in the United States meant that the United 
States could no longer supply its allies as well as itself 
during supply interruptions, ending what had been an 
important element in U.S. influence in international affairs. 
Second, the major exporting countries began taking over 
ownership of their oil industry and establishing national 
oil companies, a process largely completed by the end of the 
decade.2 Full ownership of all aspects of their oil industries 
gave producing countries greater control over such factors 
as the pace of development of their reserves, the rate of 
production, and the destination of their exports. Third, 
instability in the Middle East, rising economic nationalism, 
the decline of British power, and the changing dynamics of 
the Cold War raised questions about the ability of the West 
to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil.
The 362 well-chosen documents in this volume of the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series illuminate the 
events, the decisions, and, to a lesser extent, the processes 
that drove these changes. The profusion of documents from 
the Nixon Presidential Materials collection reflects the 
growing influence of the White House, and especially the 
National Security Council. 
The volume covers a wide range of topics and countries. 
This review can only focus on a few of the key issues, 
however, so many interesting topics will not be discussed, 
such as Venezuelan oil developments, U.S. energy relations 
with Canada, and a possible deal with the Soviet Union 
involving liquefied natural gas. Researchers should also 
note that there are documents relating to the ability of the 
West to maintain access to Middle East oil that are in other 
volumes of the FRUS series.3
In February 1969, President Richard Nixon appointed 
a task force to carry out a comprehensive review of the 
decade-old Mandatory Oil Import Program, which set 
quotas on oil imports. Changing the program raised 
major domestic political problems, pitting independent 
oil companies and the major oil producing states against 
the petrochemical industry, independent refiners, and 
consumers, especially in New England, where oil was 
widely used for heating as well as for transportation (3, 33).4 
There were also international concerns: Canada and Mexico 
wanted to preserve their special access to U.S. markets, and 
Venezuela and Iran argued that they also deserved special 
treatment (16). A majority of the task force recommended 
replacing the existing oil import quota system with a system 
of preferential tariffs favoring Canada and other Western 
Hemisphere producers. A December 1969 memorandum 
from the president to his assistant for domestic affairs, 
John Ehrlichman, suggests that Nixon decided to defer a 
decision on the issue for domestic political reasons (22).
Oil imports made up 22.6 percent of the U.S. oil supply 
in 1969, and the issue of dependence on foreign sources of 
oil raised questions about the security of supplies for the 
United States and its allies. An August 1969 study by the 
Central Intelligence Agency noted that “the most likely 
source of a serious disruption of world oil supplies that 
would affect US access to oil” was the Arab world, which 
produced over half of the oil moving in world trade. Arab 
states would probably attempt to deny oil to the United 
States in the event of another Arab-Israeli war, and most 
major Arab oil exporting states were “susceptible to 
domestic strife.” Nevertheless, the report concluded that it 
was “highly unlikely that the US would encounter serious 
difficulties in obtaining its foreign oil requirements over 
the next 10 to 20 years” (8). 
In September 1969, a military coup in Libya replaced the 
conservative regime of King Idris with a radical nationalist 
regime led by Colonel Muammar Qaddhafi. The new 
regime demanded higher prices for Libyan oil and a greater 
share of company profits. Libyan oil was favorably located 
in relation to oil markets in Western Europe and the United 
States, and its low sulfur content and high API gravity 
(the oil density standard set by the American Petroleum 
Institute), better than most crude oil from the Persian Gulf, 
made it more especially valuable to refiners. 
After months of difficult negotiations, the companies 
gave in to Libyan demands. There was little excess capacity 
in world oil markets; and high tanker rates stemming from 
the continued closure of the Suez Canal, the shutdown of 
the Trans-Arabian pipeline that carried around 12 percent 
of Saudi production to the Mediterranean, and the on-going 
dispute between Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company, 
which limited the flow of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, 
gave Libyan oil a considerable transportation advantage. 
Libya also possessed sufficient financial reserves to do 
without oil revenues for an extended period of time. In these 
circumstances U.S. policymakers were reluctant to force a 
showdown with Libya that could result in a disruption of 
world oil supplies and/or nationalization of U.S. firms (45, 
50, 51, 55, 59, 61, 64).
The Libyan success emboldened other members of 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) to demand price and tax increases. In response, 
the oil companies decided to present a united front to 
OPEC. Under the guidance of oil company counsel John 
J. McCloy, and in cooperation with the Departments of 
State and Justice, the companies informed OPEC that they 
would negotiate only if the settlement covered all com-
panies and all countries. The Justice Department issued 
business review letters permitting U.S. companies to take 
collective action without violating the antitrust laws, and 
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the companies operating in Libya signed an agreement 
pledging to support each other in case of cutbacks by Lib-
ya (65, 66).
Analyses prepared by the State Department and the 
NSC staff concluded, however, that it was not clear if the 
companies could win a confrontation with the producing 
countries and warned that adopting a strong position in 
favor of the companies could further erode the U.S. position 
in the Middle East. Moreover, to an extent, higher oil prices 
were in the U.S. economic interest. The United States was 
a major oil producer and home to five of the seven great 
international oil companies (the so-called Seven Sisters), so 
higher prices benefited some sectors of the U.S. economy. As 
far as U.S. companies with production in OPEC countries 
were concerned, higher oil prices were not a problem as 
long as they applied to all companies. Higher oil prices for 
Western Europe and Japan would also reduce the economic 
advantage over the United States they had enjoyed as a 
result of low oil prices. Finally, the companies were not 
opposed to higher prices as long as they could achieve 
some assurance of stability (68, 69, 80).
National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger warned 
Nixon that if the companies held the line against Libyan 
OPEC demands, the producers might shut down production. 
Libya, in particular, would probably cut off oil exports 
and could could be joined by Iraq and possibly other Arab 
states. A Libyan-Iraqi shutdown would cause significant oil 
shortages in Europe. The United States no longer had the 
spare capacity to help compensate for a cut-off of oil supplies 
to Europe and could free oil for Europe only by rationing oil 
domestically. Disruptions in oil supply could also damage 
the international economy, lead to the nationalization of 
U.S. oil company holdings, impair European security, and 
increase pressure on the United States to change its policies 
toward Israel. In addition, the Europeans might try to head 
off shortages by striking government-to-government deals 
with Libya, at the expense of U.S. and British companies 
(73).
Reinforcing this message, the shah of Iran told U.S. 
envoy John Irwin II that that it would not be possible for 
Iran and the other Persian Gulf producers to dictate terms 
to Venezuela or the radical Arab producers and therefore 
negotiations with the Persian Gulf producers should be 
held separately from those with Mediterranean producers 
(Libya, Algeria, and Iraq; the latter delivered some most of 
its oil exports to the Mediterranean by pipeline). The Saudis 
agreed with the shah’s position, and the Mediterranean 
producers, led by Libya, refused to negotiate until 
after the negotiations with the Persian Gulf producers 
were concluded (74, 75, 81, 82). Therefore, the Nixon 
administration decided to accept separate negotiations.
Negotiations between the companies and the Persian 
Gulf producers resulted in a price increase of 35 cents a 
barrel, a tax rate of 55 percent, and regular increases in 
prices between 1971 and 1975 to offset inflation. In April, 
the Mediterranean producers and the companies signed 
an agreement that raised prices an additional 90 cents per 
barrel for the Mediterranean producers. A month later, 
Nigeria, which had recently joined OPEC, received terms 
similar to those the Mediterranean producers got.5
In addition to prices and taxes, OPEC countries began 
to assert themselves on questions of ownership and 
control. In 1968, OPEC adopted a resolution declaring that 
producing countries had the right to participate in the 
ownership of their oil. At the end of July 1971, Venezuela 
passed a Hydrocarbons Reversion Law, which provided 
for an immediate increase in government control of the oil 
companies and for a complete government takeover of the 
oil industry when the companies’ concessions expired in 
the 1980s. In September, OPEC called for member countries 
to begin negotiations with the oil companies on the question 
of participation in the ownership of their oil operations (91, 
143).
The oil companies and the U.S. government viewed 
participation as little more than negotiated nationaliza-
tion, but there was little the United States, Britain, or the 
oil companies could do to oppose it (98, 112). Negotiations 
went slowly until actions by Algeria, Libya, and Iraq pro-
vided an indication of what non-negotiated nationaliza-
tion would entail. Algeria had nationalized 51 percent of 
the assets of the French oil companies operating in Al-
geria’s oil industry in February 1971, and in December, 
Libya nationalized British Petroleum’s holdings in retali-
ation for Britain’s alleged role in permitting Iran to seize 
islands in the Persian Gulf. In June 1972, after an eleven-
year dispute, Iraq nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Com-
pany.6
The Iraqi nationalization, in particular, convinced the 
companies to reach an agreement. In October 1972, the 
Arab Gulf states and the oil companies signed a General 
Agreement on Participation that provided for 25 percent 
government participation to take effect on January 1, 
1973, with scheduled increases leading to 51 percent gov-
ernment ownership by the beginning of 1982. The agree-
ments compensated the companies on the basis of updat-
ed book value and guaranteed them the right to purchase 
most of the production of the oil that now belonged to the 
governments. Iran, which had technically owned its own 
oil industry since 1951, reached an agreement with the 
consortium in the spring of 1973 that provided for Iranian 
management and control of the industry, with the com-
panies continuing to provide operating services and pur-
chasing the bulk of Iranian production at prices equal to 
those received by the other Gulf states. Not to be outdone, 
the Libyan government nationalized 51 percent of all the 
companies operating in Libya in August and September 
1973 (124, 130, 131, 134,170).
In a widely circulated paper not printed in this vol-
ume, James Akins, head of the State Department Office 
of Fuels and Energy, argued that the world oil economy 
had entered a “seller’s market” and that the best short-
term policy was to allow prices to rise and gradually cede 
control over ownership in order to forestall the use of oil 
as a political weapon and avoid a cut-off of oil supplies. 
Accommodating the producing countries would also buy 
time until the United States could develop alternative 
sources of oil and thus lessen OPEC’s leverage. Although 
higher oil prices could feed inflation and slow economic 
growth, they could also stimulate increased investment 
and production, especially in such high-cost areas as 
Alaska, off-shore fields, Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and 
the North Sea, and eventually make the West less depen-
dent on Middle East oil. Higher oil prices could also en-
courage conservation, increased efficiency in oil use, and 
increased utilization of alternative sources of energy such 
as coal and nuclear power.7 Secretary of State William P. 
Rogers sent Nixon a draft of Akins’ study in March 1972 
(116).
A July 1972 NSC memo responding to the Akins 
study warned that the changes in the balance of power 
between oil producers and oil consumers had the poten-
tial to become a security problem. The Arab states were 
gaining the ability to apply “serious pressure” on U.S. 
policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict; in particular, they 
were building up the financial capacity to sustain a total 
embargo over a long period.8 The memo recommended 
giving top priority “to addressing the overall foreign pol-
icy ramifications of oil policy.” Some NSC staff members 
were opposed to action at the time, however, and Nixon 
and Kissinger were preoccupied with other matters such 
as the Vietnam War, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 
and the opening to China. As a result, Nixon did not ap-
prove a study of oil issues until March 1973 (127, note 5; 
171).
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In May, while the NSC was preparing its study, the 
CIA issued a National Intelligence Analytical Memoran-
dum concluding that although “there probably will be some 
small interruptions of oil supply during the 1970s . . . a ma-
jor and sustained embargo on oil shipments by the Arab states 
working in concert is highly unlikely” (185, emphasis added). 
The NSC study, NSSM 174: “National Security and U.S. 
Energy Policy,” was completed in August. It warned that 
increasing oil imports made the United States increasing-
ly vulnerable to short-term supply interruptions.9 While 
the United States could still meet its military needs for 
oil, a sharp reduction in oil supplies caused by war in 
the Middle East or “a politically motivated decision” to 
embargo oil shipments to the United States could cause 
severe economic problems. 
NSC staff memos on NSSM 174 noted that growing 
frustration among the Arabs over lack of progress to-
ward an Arab-Israeli settlement, pressure from radical 
Arab states, or a radical takeover of Saudi Arabia or an-
other Gulf state could result in the use of oil as a political 
weapon to force a change in U.S. policies toward Israel. To 
avoid this situation, the United States had to “show some 
movement on the Arab-Israeli problem” and try harder to 
accommodate the security and economic concerns of the 
“moderate” Arabs. The “overriding concern” should be to 
prevent Saudi Arabia from becoming radicalized or “fall-
ing under the control of a Qaddafi” (192, 193).
The volume documents increasing indications that 
the Saudis were becoming more and more upset about 
U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli dispute. It contains exam-
ples of warnings by Saudi officials that unless the United 
States put pressure on Israel to reach a settlement with 
the Arab states, Saudi Arabia would be forced to use its 
oil resources as a political weapon (176, 178, 183, 199). The 
volume also includes documents showing that some high 
Saudi officials undercut those warnings by giving assur-
ances that the kingdom would not use oil as a weapon 
against the United States (181, 189, 197).
Over one-third of the volume documents the U.S. re-
sponse to the oil embargo and production cuts imposed 
by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OAPEC) in October 1973. It is important to empha-
size that the production cutbacks and embargo were un-
dertaken by OAPEC, not OPEC. Non-Arab members of 
OPEC, such as Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia, 
did not cut back production or embargo shipments to the 
United States and the Netherlands. Calling the embargo 
“the OPEC embargo,” as is common in both scholarly and 
popular studies, obscures the specific political circum-
stances that led to it. 
One of the more controversial issues covered in the 
volume is U.S. military intervention against the Arab oil 
producers. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and 
National Security Advisor Kissinger both made public 
threats of military intervention. Kissinger, who also be-
came secretary of state in September, wrote in his mem-
oirs that “these were not empty threats” and that contin-
gency plans were prepared. Schlesinger later told inter-
viewers that the United States planned to make use of 
already scheduled military exercises in the Persian Gulf 
as a cover for intervention in Abu Dhabi.10
The volume contains several documents where the 
possibility of intervention is mentioned (229, 247, 251, 253), 
and there is an extensive editorial note (244) on the issue. 
Also included is a heavily redacted NSC memorandum, 
dated 30 November (255), that summarized a CIA study of 
U.S. options for ending the Saudi oil embargo and probably 
included military options.11 
The British government took Schlesinger’s statements 
seriously and commissioned a study on the possibility of 
the United States using force against Arab oil producers. 
The study concluded that if the United States intervened 
before exhausting all possibilities of a peaceful settlement, 
the consequences for European interests would be 
“disastrous,” especially if the intervention curtailed rather 
than expanded access to oil.12
In the end, the United States did not take military 
action, probably because analyses indicated that military 
action would probably result in destruction of the oil 
facilities they were trying to control. The Saudis made it 
clear that, if attacked, they would destroy their oil facilities, 
thus denying the West access to their oil for many years. 
In addition, most European countries would have opposed 
the use of force except as a last resort. 
The volume also contains several documents that 
demonstrate that the United States sought to use the oil 
crisis as way to regain leverage over Western Europe and 
Japan. A June 1973 NSC paper had pointed out that U.S. 
leverage in energy matters stemmed from its economic and 
political influence with Saudi Arabia and Iran, two of the 
richest oil exporters; its lead in most fields of energy-related 
technology; and its status as the only major consumer nation 
with significant domestic oil resources (187). Similarly, NSC 
studies in August and early October called for the United 
States to capitalize on energy-related issues to gain leverage 
over its allies (193, 208).
During the crisis, the State Department Policy Planning 
Staff pointed out that the United States, as the only major 
Western country that could not be shut down by an oil 
embargo, had an opportunity to “revitalize” its alliances 
(256). What “revitalize” meant is clear from an NSC 
memorandum written in early December 1973, which noted 
that “the unique role of the U.S. in the current oil crisis 
and in the longer term oil situation gives us some leverage 
with the Europeans. We have the power to make their oil 
situation better or worse” (261). A National Intelligence 
Estimate made similar points (262). 
Most European countries, including the United 
Kingdom, recognized what the United States was doing. 
In addition, most viewed the crisis as the result of U.S. 
policies. Most, however, with the significant exception of 
France, went along with U.S. plans to establish a consumer 
group to balance the power of the producers. 
The documents also trace Kissinger’s efforts to 
convince the Saudis to end the embargo by working 
for ceasefire agreements between Israel and Egypt and 
Syria. A telephone conversation between Kissinger and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements in March 
of 1974 (335) hints that another reason the Saudis agreed 
to end the embargo was that the United States took steps 
to strengthen its military and economic ties with the 
kingdom. In addition to providing military training and 
technical assistance, the United States recommitted itself 
to protecting the Saudi regime against internal as well as 
external enemies. Although agreements on these matters 
were not signed until June, a telephone conversation 
between Nixon and Kissinger on 11 March suggests that 
they saw such measures as a way to influence Saudi oil 
policies. 13 Most Arab states agreed to end the embargo on 
18 March.14 On that same day the Saudis announced that 
they would immediately increase oil production by one 
million barrels a day. Syria and Israel signed a ceasefire 
agreement on 31 May. 
The last section of the volume deals mostly with the 
economic impact of higher oil prices, especially on oil-
importing developing countries (346, 351, 356). There are 
also documents that illustrate the differences between the 
shah and the Saudis on oil prices (353, 360, 361).
FRUS volumes are not a substitute for archival research 
(though they are an invaluable guide to archival sources) or 
a firm command of the secondary literature. Nevertheless, 
this outstanding volume demonstrates why FRUS 
remains an indispensable resource for serious students of 
international relations. By making a wide variety of well-
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chosen primary documents available (on line as well as in 
print format), FRUS volumes allow scholars to judge for 
themselves the sources and dynamics of U.S. foreign policy. 
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Fifty Shades of Multilateralism: A Review of Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVII, 
Energy Crisis, 1974–1980
Christopher R. W. Dietrich
This FRUS volume, edited by Steven Galpern, covers U.S. foreign policy from August 1974 to January 1981. Through a mélange of memoranda, minutes, policy 
papers, and telegrams, the superb collection reconstructs 
the various and often disjointed strategies employed to 
mitigate the damage of rising oil prices to the U.S. and 
global economy. The decision to traverse presidential 
administrations is a good one, because it allows readers to 
reflect on the continuities that swirl beneath the umbrella 
of the “energy crisis.” 
The decision by the State Department historians to so 
designate this volume may seem strange to some. After 
all, a number of scholars, following in the footsteps of 
MIT economist Morris Adelman, who in 1974 likened the 
oil price increases to “the sound of one hand clapping,” 
have recently argued that no crisis existed.1 Social theorist 
Timothy Mitchell discusses “the crisis that never happened,” 
geographer Matthew Huber emphasizes its “qualitative” 
and “refined” nature, and Middle East historian Toby 
Jones writes that “the initial shock” of high prices wore off 
quickly for U.S. officials.2 The crisis deniers may be right on 
the technical level of supply and demand, although many 
economists disagree.3 For diplomatic historians concerned 
with the opinions and policies formed within the Ford and 
Carter administrations, crisis denial makes a subtler point. 
An impersonal emphasis on economic strictures cannot 
explain the crisis or the shadow it cast. An economistic 




Energy Crisis makes it clear that emotion and 
psychology are central to understanding the mentality that 
informed and often drove U.S. policy towards oil prices.4 In 
this case, the political psychology of emotion cuts in at least 
two different directions: first as a category of analysis and 
second as a strategy.  
High oil prices led to what Joseph Nye called in 1980 
a new “rhetoric of energy security,” which confirmed a 
collective anxiety about the status of the international 
economy.5  The emotive thrust is most viscerally revealed in 
sentiments expressed by Henry Kissinger. The weight of his 
personality dominates the first half of the volume—whether 
he is carping about the “feckless and gutless” Saudis, 
proposing the Egyptians use stones from the pyramids to 
dam the Nile, calling Zbigniew Brzezinski a “total whore,” 
or dealing with substantive concerns (2, 56, 95). His bombast 
turns agonistic over and over again, especially when he 
invokes the future well-being of the West. Expensive oil 
narrowed “opportunities for governments to control their 
countries’ own political and economic destiny,” he wrote 
the Japanese, British, and French foreign ministers in 1974 
(18). The crisis threatened to cause “the moral and political 
disintegration of the West,” he told the French foreign 
minister (24).  
Others shared this sentiment. “Since it is a matter 
of psychological confidence, there is no such thing as 
a moderate increase,” Alan Greenspan said in 1976 
(112). The Iran shortfall after December 1978 threatened 
a “more serious, psychologically-induced shortage,” 
Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger warned (181). That 
the psychological aspect of the crisis was so discernible 
indicates its strategic value, and emotion was used as a 
diplomatic weapon of various degrees of bluntness.  
In their most incisive moments, policymakers pitted 
the “theological,” “irrational,” and “demagogic appeals” of 
the oil producers against their own more sober assessments 
(41, 47, 53).  Most often, those assessments responded to the 
universal values of the free market. High oil prices were 
“not the result of economic factors . . . the free play of supply 
and demand,” Kissinger told the UN General Assembly in 
1974 (8). The “irresponsible behavior of OPEC” was little 
more than the “repeated distortion of the world’s economic 
structure,” another official wrote in 1977 (116). “The 
1973-1974 oil embargo and massive price increase which 
followed, caused a major global economic disruption,” 
Brzezinski told Carter (121).  
This dramatic dialectic identified “OPEC unilateralism” 
as an illiberal bogeyman, a negative counter-image of the 
free market. American policy not only demonized OPEC, it 
also made the parallel argument that the “free market” was 
the only rational system capable of meeting the challenges 
of the new global economy. William Simon, the ideologically 
driven Treasury secretary who later coined the term 
“conservative counterintelligentsia,” was more rabid than 
any other administration official on this point.6 “[P]rices 
will come down soon, if we just let the market work,” he 
told Kissinger on one occasion. When Kissinger questioned 
his analysis, the response was simple: “Well, there’s a lot 
of oil in the world” (39). It was this faith in the market that 
led  British Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey to 
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complain that Simon was “far to the right of Genghis Kahn 
and totally devoted to the freedom of markets.”7 
But Simon was not alone. Many others accused OPEC 
of skewing the “the objective conditions for equilibrium in 
the oil market” (56). Its December 1976 decision to increase 
prices—“citing artificial economic justifications and 
ignoring the destructive consequences of their actions”—
reflected a lack of “international responsibility,” Gerald 
Ford said (113). “The OPEC cartel pushed prices far beyond 
the level that economics would dictate,” Kissinger told a 
group of congressmen in June 1975. The price rise was the 
result of a “political decision made possible by the cohesion 
of the oil producers group” (65). Price increases were 
“unwarranted by market conditions and harmful to the 
world economy,” Cyrus Vance wrote in a 1977 démarche 
(136).
Such public and private rhetoric about “universal 
economic goals” skimmed over a more complex reality, 
one that is most evident in discussions about U.S. currency 
depreciation and the potential for a “serious attack on the 
dollar” (178, 148, 153, 161). Those conversations capture an 
insecurity that had begun to permeate American economic 
culture long before the price increases, resulting largely 
from problems with the American balance of payments 
and, subsequently, the U.S. gold stock and value of the 
dollar.8 The psychology and emotions of the crisis are 
evident to varying degrees in a number of other topics, 
including the new function of private finance in the 
international economy, the role of the U.S. military in the 
Persian Gulf, and U.S. relations with its European allies, 
key oil producers, and the “less-developed countries.”
“Armageddon as Fun City”
Energy Crisis presents a reservoir of evidence affirming 
the overarching concern of U.S. officials about the price 
of oil. High prices rang the dread bells of anxiety for the 
international financial system in particular, as the yawning 
current account surpluses of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
the United Arab Emirates “created international financial 
uncertainty” (130). Large loans would be needed to offset 
“oil debt” and restore “confidence in the financial system 
and the creditworthiness of participating governments,” 
Kissinger wrote German chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 
November 1974 (17). “We’ve got to come up with ways 
to soak up their dough,” Kissinger told Simon and his 
economic staff. “If those Bedouins want to use all of their 
money to build soccer stadiums, that’s fine with me” (39). 
“To be effective in combatting fear,” Treasury officials 
designed a number of mixed public-private capital programs 
to promote loans to European and Third World nations. 
Loan availability would be conditioned upon judgment 
“that a prospective borrowing nation was following 
reasonable policies of self-help” (15). The 1979 proposal for 
an “International Energy Finance Corporation” reveals the 
contours of those policies in its emphasis on the free flow 
of capital, reduced deficit spending, and tighter monetary 
policy measures (165, 205, 211).  
The invocation of American military power also 
exposes the high emotional stakes of the crisis. Too much 
has been made of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s 
alleged consideration of a Saudi oilfield invasion, but 
Kissinger undoubtedly believed the military threat was 
diplomatically useful. The New York Times reported in 
January 1975 that Kissinger had told Business Week that he 
could not rule out the use of force against oil-producing 
nations “in the gravest emergency” (30). Two weeks later, 
he asked CIA Director William Colby and Secretary of 
Defense William Clements about the use of force in the 
case of a “total” oil embargo. “I’m not saying we have to 
take over Saudi Arabia,” he said. “How about Abu Dhabi, 
or Libya?” (32).  
The ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akins, rebuked 
that public policy in one of the most interesting documents 
Galpern has dug up. The memo, entitled “War for Oil: 
Armageddon as Fun City,” called into question two central 
premises of U.S. foreign policy: first, that expensive oil stood 
at the root of the world’s economic problems, and second, 
that the United States had “the right to take the oil.” Invasion 
was folly, Akins wrote, “something one would expect to 
read only in standard communist propaganda describing 
the moral bankruptcy of America.” Furthermore, to believe 
that a forced reduction in prices would miraculously solve 
global economic woes was to “share the fairytale beliefs 
of certain academicians newly converted to the dubious 
pleasures of militarism” (52). 
Kissinger told European heads-of-state that such threats 
put the producers on notice that they could not “underwrite 
the oil price increases for free without paying an economic 
and political price” (88). But after a forceful Saudi response, 
he and other members of the U.S. government immediately 
backpedaled from their bellicose stance. He also fired 
Akins.9
“Unholy Union”
The energy crisis left European consumers “scared 
to death” and created disarray in U.S. relations with the 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (15). 
In that context, the United States consistently sought to 
forge “consumer solidarity” in order to “shift the balance 
of power vis-à-vis the producing countries,” offsetting a 
weakness that threatened to “destroy the cohesion of the 
Western world” (6, 9). Policies for collaboration ranged 
from conservation, “financial solidarity measures,” and 
pressure on the oil producers to lower prices (7). There 
was a marked difference between the United States and its 
European allies, however, and the documents emphasize 
British, German, and especially French opposition to 
American proposals regarding the merits of cooperation. 
At the root of that opposition was a strategic disagreement 
about whether the United States would participate in the 
consumer-producer conference proposed first by Saudi 
Arabia and then by France. The United States refused to 
do so until the consumers showed “greater solidarity” 
and “progress on financial cooperation” (26, 28). To fail to 
present a cohesive Western front “would legitimize current 
high prices,” Ford told his counterparts (88).   
When the United States did agree to producer-consumer 
meetings, it sought to do so from a position of relative 
strength vis-à-vis OPEC and, more broadly, the developing 
world. As documents from the recent FRUS volume on the 
United Nations reveal, the success of the OPEC nations in 
controlling the price of energy was depicted and received 
as a greater victory for the raw-material producing Third 
World.10 The developing countries saw the oil price 
increases “as legitimate exploitation of market power rather 
than unfair use of monopoly power,” Healey explained 
to Kissinger (9). Those countries, which British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson called “the other ‘PEC’s,’” saw the 
oil producers as an exemplar of raw material solidarity, 
and they worked to create production agreements for 
phosphate, copper, and other minerals (38).  
The “unholy union” between OPEC and the Third 
World, to use a phrase shared by Schmidt and Kissinger, 
unnerved policymakers for a time (88). But after the National 
Security Council and the State Department confirmed the 
security of “non-fuel, industrial raw materials,” Kissinger 
decided to pull back from his aggressive and wholesale 
denunciation of the New International Economic Order.11 
He instructed the U.S. delegation to the first producer-
consumer conference not to debate the Third World 
position. “The art here is to look positive without getting 
carried away by your rhetoric,” he said (49). Later he told 
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a congressional delegation that the goal of a more serene 
policy was “to break up the LDC coalition so that we can 
deal with each issue separately” (65). 
That was also the rationale behind the creation of the 
Conference on International Economic Cooperation. Its 
objective was to emphasize the “severe impact” of high oil 
prices on the non-oil developing countries and to explore 
“new ways of financing raw material development” (62, 98). 
The conference would also help increase the oil producers’ 
perception “of their direct stake in the economic and 
political well-being of the industrialized countries and 
their need to take into account of their new responsibilities 
for the well-being of the world economy” (122). In addition, 
the Carter administration used the conference as a 
“cooperation program” to emphasize the “role of private 
capital” and the need for the developing nations to improve 
“their investment climate” (120, 125). 
“Persian Gulf Chips”
 
The longstanding American objective “to break 
the political and economic power of OPEC” involved 
cooperation with fickle partners in Europe and the Third 
World (40). Algeria (and to some extent Iran) had led “a 
crusade on behalf of the Third World” in the previous half-
decade, linking the “artificially low oil price for petroleum 
in the past” to a powerful internationalist rhetoric 
condemning neo-colonialism (47, 48). That policy, at least as 
the State Department saw it, sought to bind the producers 
together even as it divided the consumers (40). Policymakers 
in the State and the Treasury departments spent much of 
the decade searching for ways to “put strains on OPEC” 
and push for “greater friction among OPEC countries” in 
order to limit the “common desire” to maintain high prices 
and take away “some of [OPEC’s] confidence” (47).    
Despite some success in the long-term goal of 
diversifying its oil supply, the United States still had to 
negotiate with the major players in OPEC, which was, 
after all, “playing with Persian Gulf chips,” as Kissinger 
said (88). No country had as much oil as Saudi Arabia. “No 
international agreement on oil pricing or on use of OPEC 
reserves can have any meaning without Saudi support,” 
NSC official Robert Hormats wrote. For this reason, 
policymakers in the Ford and Carter administrations 
consistently worked to convince the Saudi government to 
increase its production, which would ease pressure on the 
market (56, 166, 185). But the Saudis stood their ground in 
talks with the Americans. The three conversations between 
Kissinger and Saudi Minister of Petroleum Ahmed Zaki 
Yamani that are included in this volume reveal a tense but 
respectful relationship, with Kissinger often deferring to 
Yamani (41, 55, 81).  It appears that Yamani even helped 
persuade Kissinger to reverse U.S. policy on the linkage 
between oil and other raw materials in mid-1975 (55, 61, 64). 
An about-face in Cold War tactics provides another 
indication of the extent of the power of the oil producers. 
Just a decade earlier, the Nixon administration had 
lamented the Saudi tendency to depict the Soviets as “ten 
feet tall” and reminded the Saudis that “indigenous factors 
rather than Moscow-directed Communist conspiracies” 
played an important part in regional politics.12 Now Ford 
told the Saudi ambassador that high oil prices could 
embolden “Soviet influence in the Middle East” (111). The 
Carter administration also emphasized the potential Cold 
War fall-out, reminding Saudi leaders of “the real danger 
to political stability in Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Italy, and 
several key developing countries if economic conditions 
deteriorate further” (131).
The other producer that dominated the official mind in 
the United States was Iran. By late 1974, officials began to 
depict relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia as a zero-sum 
game. This was a long cry from the bridge-building efforts 
that began in the Johnson administration and climaxed with 
the Twin Pillars doctrine. Most telling, perhaps, is a June 
1975 discussion between Kissinger and Alan Greenspan 
about the benefits of a bilateral oil agreement with the 
shah. The United States had railed against “rapacious” 
European bilateralism since October 1973 but began to 
seriously consider their own bilateral deals in late 1974 (56, 
96, 99). Greenspan worried that the proposed agreement, 
by which excess Iranian oil would be traded for Treasury 
notes at a discount, would “be at Saudi expense.” But he 
believed in the risk because such an agreement would have 
a “devastating impact on OPEC” (67). Kissinger agreed and 
wrote Ford that the deal “could lead to a break in OPEC 
prices reflecting market forces” (77). “What I’m after is the 
symbolism of the Shah breaking the OPEC line,” he told 
other officials (95).
Historians do not know when or how Saudi Arabia got 
wind of these negotiations, but Yamani effectively pressured 
the Ford and Carter administrations to accept Saudi power 
to control the price of oil (81, 188, 200). Before the OPEC 
meetings in Vienna, Bali, Doha, and Abu Dhabi between 
1975 and 1978, American officials worked to influence the 
Saudi position on price, a stance they believed had paid 
dividends when the Saudi government began to increase 
production after December 1976 (82, 98, 116, 180). The Carter 
administration used a number of “Petroleum Supply 
Vulnerability Assessments” to encourage a closer military 
relationship with the Saudi monarchy in hopes that arms 
sales would provide further incentive for price moderation 
in the face of “the over-riding decision of Saudi Arabia to 
maintain OPEC unity” (152, 127). The administration also 
continued the nascent Kissinger policy of “Saudi financing 
of U.S. arms sales to other countries” to mitigate the sense 
that U.S.-Saudi interests were “diverging on energy” (202). 
The correspondence between Carter and King Fahd after 
1979, and especially upon the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, 
lays bare the extraordinary level of importance the Saudi 
price power had in the formulation of U.S. policy (277, 281, 
291). 
“Abnormal ‘Distress’ Prices”
Notwithstanding the recent claim that 1979 marked 
“the birth” of this century, the year was characterized 
as much by continuity as by change in international oil 
politics.13 To be sure, the shah fled Iran, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan, and Iran went to war with Iraq (166, 
257, 288). But those events sharpened preexisting concerns 
about oil prices as much as they spawned new ones. The 
Iranian Revolution revealed “the fragility of the market 
balance” and the need to pressure Saudi Arabia to increase 
production (182, 183). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
augmented fears about the security of Gulf oil supplies, 
and the identification of the Persian Gulf as a keystone in 
the “arc of crisis” reinforced preexisting commitments to 
supply (229, 276). The argument against OPEC continued 
to be the same. Price increases “would imperil the fragile 
global economic recovery” and were “not justified by 
the current market supply and demand balance for oil,” 
Hormats told Vance (130). The State Department continued 
the policy of “convincing the OPEC countries of their stake 
in the health of the world economy,” as letters from Carter 
about “the extremely delicate” international monetary 
system to leaders in Indonesia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia 
made clear (199, 141, 163, 176). 
If anything, the Carter administration invoked with 
greater intensity the emotional international politics of 
energy, which Warren Christopher self-consciously called 
a “shortage psychology” (200). “Abnormal ‘distress’ prices 
should not be used to justify” a price increase, the State 
Department wrote its ambassador in Riyadh (188). The 
anxiety of the Carter administration produced a knotty 
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and often disorganized policy response, reflected in an 
almost farcical discussion over the definition of “extreme 
moderation” on oil prices in November 1978 (168, 178). When 
the administration did take decisive action, it emphasized 
the same set of problems and solutions as its predecessor. 
The U.S. ambassador in Brussels, Anne Chambers, captured 
the parallel when she described the “spectacle” of 1979 as 
giving her “an uncomfortable feeling of ‘déjà vu’” (189). 
“World Economic Health”
To discuss these and other issues, Energy Crisis plumbs 
the depths of wonderful sources, including the controversial 
Kissinger Papers and another closed set of papers in the 
Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, those of 
James Schlesinger. (Alas, one continues to wonder what 
documents lie under lock and key in the Brzezinski papers 
at the library and in the personal papers of George Shultz, 
located at the Hoover Institution.) In the realm of records 
open to historians, Galpern has looked in all the right 
places in the presidential libraries and the records of the 
Department of State at the National Archives. Researchers 
may also find much of interest in two records he did not 
consult: the papers of Winston Lord and Anthony Lake, who 
directed the Policy Planning staffs of the State Department 
under the Ford and Carter administrations.  
Energy Crisis is also an exciting collection because 
it points to scheduled FRUS volumes on the Iranian 
Revolution, Saudi Arabia, foreign economic policy, and 
the United Nations. It also suggests a number of topics for 
fruitful exploration. In terms of the national histories of the 
major oil producers and consumers, many questions arise. 
How deep were the internal divisions in Saudi Arabia and 
Iran over oil prices? Why did the Saudi government increase 
production to restrain the price increases in January 1977? 
Did Algerian diplomacy contradict its strong public rhetoric 
linking oil prices to broader Third World questions? What 
was the effect of the petrodollar surplus on the region? How 
did the crisis change the processes of European integration? 
What did the key oil-producing nations say to each other? 
Scholars like Roham Alvandi, Victor McFarland, Jeffrey 
Byrne, Giuliano Garavini, and David Wight have already 
begun to examine these questions and others.14                                       
The psychological and emotional costs of expensive 
oil were also evident in domestic politics, as revealed by 
the “increasingly heated controversy . . . over the price of 
oil and gas, and its consequences for the economy” (72, 75, 
87). Carter announced the phasing out of price controls to 
his political detriment (175, 187, 196). But it is difficult to 
adduce other aspects of the relationship between domestic 
politics and foreign policy, especially because little mention 
is made of the important Senate investigations into the oil 
industry and its “windfall profits” by Frank Church and 
Edward Kennedy.15 These may be beyond the purview of 
the volume, but the documents indicate a tantalizing space 
between domestic and foreign policy. Still, scholars will be 
able to use the volume to build on the relationship between 
cheap oil, American political culture, and the role of the 
market in foreign policy.16                                
Of great interest is the fuzzy relationship between the 
ideology of the free market and the formation of foreign 
policy. In one of the droller quotes of the volume, William 
Simon tells Kissinger, “We don’t have to do uneconomic 
things to solve this. We are soon going to be swimming 
in oil” (23). Simon eloquently defended the free market 
in a speech to the Independent Petroleum Association in 
October 1974. For some people, he complained, “the idea 
of free enterprise” seemed to have “lost its sheen” in the 
face of expensive oil. Simon believed this reaction was 
overblown:  
I totally disagree, and I do so on the very solid 
grounds of economic realism and American 
tradition. A nation that can tame the wilderness, 
that has the most dynamic free market-place in the 
history of man, that can lift the standard of living to 
heights hitherto unknown, and can then place men 
on the moon—that nation, if it allows free enterprise 
full freedom, is not going to be cowed by the sudden 
threat of blackmail.17  
Simon’s vision of an inimitable United States may have 
been matchless in its ideological determination, but that 
speech captures the emotion that governed American 
policy towards expensive oil.  
Galpern presents U.S. policy as “primarily multilateral” 
in his preface, as a search for “a common strategy” to deal 
with high oil prices, but that assertion does not imply 
that an overriding attentiveness led policymakers to 
sacrifice the national interest on the altar of global well-
being. Galpern enables us to view matters through a more 
skeptical lens. Policymakers railed against “bilateralism” 
and “unilateralism,” but their emotional emphasis on 
“world economic health” was no less unilateral than the 
policies of their interlocutors from Europe, Latin America, 
or the Arab world.  
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Imagine if the American veterans of Iwo Jima and Okinawa had returned home after Japan’s surrender to face imprisonment or execution. Even those who 
escaped jail or firing squads would live the next three 
decades in fear; branded traitors by the state, they would 
never mention their wartime service. Films, television, and 
history books would ignore them completely. Not until the 
1980s would political reforms clear their names and allow 
other Americans to learn the truth about the war. By the 
early 2010s, with the few remaining veterans mostly in 
their nineties, a nationwide network of scholars, veterans’ 
descendants, volunteers, local government officials, and 
businesspeople would join together to raise money and 
awareness in order to allow the last veterans to live their 
final years with dignity. Yet the veterans themselves would 
still await a public apology and pensions from Washington. 
Not even the most grotesque counterfactual history 
could envision our “Greatest Generation” enduring such a 
fate, but as I discovered while researching my dissertation 
in China, this is the tragedy of China’s Expeditionary Army, 
some 380,000 men who fought two long campaigns against 
the Japanese in Burma and the western part of China’s 
Yunnan province between 1942 and 1945. But thanks 
to more than two decades of grassroots work by brave 
Chinese seeking to reclaim their history from the state, two 
Chinese Expeditionary Army memorials have been erected 
in southwestern Yunnan: the Chinese Expeditionary Army 
Statues in Longling County and the West Yunnan War of 
Resistance Memorial in nearby Tengchong. The Chinese 
Expeditionary Army can never be erased from public 
consciousness again, but more work must be done to honor 
the memory of these veterans and compensate the last 
survivors.
The Chinese Expeditionary Army’s wartime experience 
was no less ghastly than the fate of its veterans during the 
Mao era. More than half of the 100,000-strong original 
force perished during the botched Allied defense of Burma 
in 1942, most of them dying as they retreated to China 
and India, having been abandoned by their American 
commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell. With 
American air support, liaison officers and equipment, the 
Chinese Expeditionary Army knocked the Japanese out 
of northern Burma and west Yunnan during the Second 
Burma Campaign that began in 1944. But as they had done 
in 1942, American and British commanders acted without 
consulting the Chinese. They diverted resources from the 
urgent defense of central China against Japan’s ICHIGO 
offensive, causing needless suffering among the troops in 
Burma. Civil War engulfed China after Japan’s surrender, 
driving Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists to Taiwan and 
dooming the Chinese veterans of the Burma campaigns 
to live or die as “counterrevolutionaries” in a communist 
tyranny. 
After Mao’s death, the government released those 
veterans still languishing in prison, and in the early 
1980s, it quietly overturned its verdict branding the men 
counterrevolutionaries. But state-manufactured popular 
memory persisted: Mao and the Communists, the story 
went, had led the heroic War of Resistance Against Japan. 
For Ge Shuya, a former history major working in 
Tengchong, something didn’t add up. As a student, Ge 
had learned that Mao’s Communists did all the fighting. 
The Americans, teachers told him, had always been 
imperialists. Yet in Tenchong, a city utterly devastated 
by the war, Ge met many Expeditionary Army veterans. 
None had ever fought under the Communists, and they 
praised the American pilots and liaison officers they had 
served with. Ge’s discovery launched his unlikely career 
as a Renaissance Man of World War II’s China-Burma-India 
(CBI) Theater: equal parts historian, explorer, translator, 
caretaker of elderly veterans, and liaison for American CBI 
veterans returning to Yunnan. 
Many others have joined Ge in reclaiming China’s 
wartime history and assisting its forgotten soldiers. A slew of 
memoirs, scholarly monographs, and archival compilations 
has been published over the past decade. Popular histories 
of the Expeditionary Army are becoming as common 
in China as D-Day stories in the United States. And on 
television, the 2009 drama Soldiers and Their Commander (Wo 
de tuanzhang wo de tuan), based on the experiences of the 
Chinese Expeditionary Army, earned wide acclaim. Now 
awakened to a more honest interpretation of their country’s 
wartime history, thousands of ordinary Chinese have come 
to the aid of the country’s elderly veterans. More than 4,000 
volunteers from the Shenzhen-based Caring For Veterans 
Network have traveled the country, seeking out veterans, 
recording their stories, and raising money to support them. 
In Longling County, Yunnan, these efforts culminated 
in the September 3 unveiling of the Chinese Expeditionary 
Army Statues war memorial. Sponsored by the county 
government and built by sculptor Li Chunhua, the memorial 
The Chinese Expeditionary 
Army: Reclaiming China’s 
Forgotten Veterans 
Zach Fredman
The author (right) and Mu Zhengguang, a Chinese 
Expeditionary Army veteran from Mangshi, Yunnan. (Author’s 
Photo)
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sits on the slopes of Songshan Mountain. Nearly 8,000 
Chinese died here in 1944 as they fought to regain the high 
ground overlooking the strategic Huitong Bridge—China’s 
only land link to the outside world— along the Burma 
Road. The memorial itself features 402 statues arranged 
in twelve groups that include commanders, child soldiers, 
infantry, female troops, and China’s American allies. At the 
center of the memorial stand twenty-eight statues of living 
veterans, each accompanied by a plaque noting the soldier’s 
hometown and wartime service. Several of the veterans 
immortalized in the monument were on hand for the event.
Following the ceremony, the crowd returned to 
Longling for a meeting where historians, veterans, members 
of veterans aid societies, and others had a chance to speak. 
Stumbling nervously through my first-ever speech in 
Chinese, I discussed my dissertation research on relations 
between American soldiers and Chinese interpreters in 
wartime Yunnan. Zeng Damin, the son of an Expeditionary 
Army regimental commander, broke down in tears as he 
thanked the Longling County government for building the 
memorial and expressed his gratitude to others among the 
crowd for reviving this once-forgotten history. “China has 
no future,” Zeng said, “if it can’t face history.” Kunming 
historian Wu Baozhang praised the veterans aid societies 
for their work and noted that “our country is opening up 
step by step, especially about this period of history.” Zhang 
Dongbi, another writer, pointed to work that remains to be 
done: “Many of the last veterans are still desperately poor; 
we must help them live more comfortably in their final 
years.” Zhang also lauded the bravery of local governments 
like Longling County for giving money to veterans, while 
the central government in Beijing has yet to do so. 
In Tenchong, just an hour and a half up the road from 
Longling County, the West Yunnan War of Resistance 
Memorial opened on August 15. Located next door to 
the Tengchong Memorial Cemetery, which was built by 
the Chinese Nationalists in 1945, destroyed during the 
Cultural Revolution, and then rebuilt in 1985, the War of 
Resistance Memorial is composed of two parts. Separating 
the older cemetery from the newer complex is the Chinese 
Expeditionary Army Wall of Names. Etched into the wall 
are the names of 103,141 Chinese and allied soldiers who 
served in the 1944–5 West Yunnan Campaign. Like the 
statues in Longling, the Wall of Names is a fitting and 
long-overdue memorial. The fact that both the provincial 
and central governments funded it makes it even more 
impressive. 
The other half of the memorial is a museum dedicated 
to the Chinese Expeditionary Army and wartime Yunnan. 
With superb maps, photographs, and hundreds of artifacts, 
the museum covers China’s war with Japan from the 1931 
Mukden Incident to victory in 1945. The displays emphasize 
the heroism of China’s soldiers fighting in Burma and west 
Yunnan—the typical story of valor common to nearly all 
state-sponsored history in China—but also stress wartime 
cooperation between China and the United States. The 
final display reminds us that “the world today is still in the 
shadow of war and not in peace. In particular, the Japanese 
right-wing forces are expanding rapidly.... [T]herefore, 
it is quite necessary to alert [the world] to the revival of 
the Japanese Militarism.” Photographs of recent military 
parades in Beijing and naval maneuvers near the disputed 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands line the walls. Competing Chinese 
and Japanese claims to these islands are beyond the scope 
of this article, but the inclusion of so much government 
propaganda about the dispute in the Tengchong museum 
underscores the limits to China’s remembrance of its 
Expeditionary Army. 
Many of China’s modern grievances against Japan 
stem from the belief that Japan has failed to admit the 
truth about the extent of its crimes against China during 
World War II and to offer sufficient apology. This position 
is understandable. Trying to refute the Nanjing Massacre, 
the existence of comfort women, or the scope of wanton 
cruelty in Japan’s war against China is no less loathsome 
than Holocaust denial. 
Yet nothing in the Tengchong museum mentions how 
much China’s Expeditionary Army veterans have suffered 
at the hands of the Chinese government. When China 
cultivates anti-Japanese nationalism through its education 
system, museums, and popular culture while at the same 
time ignoring the suffering of its own people at the hands 
of the Chinese Communist Party, its accusations against 
Japan reek of hypocrisy. Formally apologizing to the 
remaining Expeditionary Army veterans, compensating 
them for their suffering, and acknowledging their plight 
would bolster Beijing’s moral standing when it insists that 
Japan face the truth about World War II. More important, 
it would show that China is now strong enough to cast 
aside its longstanding fear of the past and has recognized 
that greater openness about its history can be no less a 
source of strength than a skyscraper, high-speed train, or 
gross domestic product figure. The grassroots movement 
to uncover the truth about China’s Expeditionary Army 
shows that Beijing’s efforts to conceal its past mistakes are 
doomed to failure anyway. 
Xu Yi, of Perth, Australia, with the statue of her father, 
Chinese Expeditionary Army veteran Xu Zhongping, at the 
Chinese Expeditionary Army Statues, Songshan Mountain, 
Longing County, Yunnan. (Author’s Photo) 
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Records relating to American foreign policy and relations and conditions overseas can be found among the files of agencies other than the Department of 
State and those closely associated with that agency, such as 
the United States Information Agency and the Agency for 
International Development and its predecessors {Economic 
Cooperation Administration (ECA), Technical Cooperation 
Administration (TCA), Mutual Security Agency (MSA), 
Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA)}.  Among the records 
of the Foreign Agricultural Service (Record Group 166), 
the Narrative Reports prepared by Agricultural Attaches, 
consular officers, and others at U.S. posts overseas are 
of particular note.  In general, the reports document 
agricultural production, technology in the agrarian sector, 
agricultural labor, and foreign agricultural policies, among 
other subjects.
The United States Government has long been interested 
in foreign agricultural activities.  In 1894, that interest was 
institutionalized when the Department of Agriculture 
established the Section of Foreign Markets to formalize the 
collection of information on the production, consumption, 
and prices of foreign farm products.  For the next 25 
years, a number of offices within the department handled 
statistical functions: the Section of Foreign Markets (1894-
1902), the Division of Foreign Markets (1902-1903), the 
Bureau of Statistics (1903-1914), and the Bureau of Crop 
Estimates (1914-1921).  In 1913, the Department established 
a new organization to handle marketing functions. Over 
the next 8 years, that function was handled by three offices: 
the Office of Markets (1913-1915), the Office of Markets and 
Rural Organization (1915-1917), and the Bureau of Markets 
(1917-1921).  
In 1921, the statistical and marketing functions 
were merged to form the Bureau of Markets and Crop 
Estimates.  That organization merged with the Office 
of Farm Management and Farm Economics in 1922 to 
form the Bureau of Agricultural Economics/Division of 
Statistical and Historical Research.  In 1930, responsibility 
was transferred to the newly formed Foreign Agricultural 
Service Division of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
that was created to administer the Foreign Agricultural 
Service.
The Foreign Agricultural Service remained part of 
the Department of Agriculture until 1939, when Federal 
Reorganization Plan II transferred it to the Department of 
State in an effort to consolidate like functions of government. 
Some of the Service’s personnel and functions, primarily 
those relating to economic research, remained with the 
Department of Agriculture where they were concentrated 
in the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, a separate 
unit within the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture.  In 
March 1953, the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations 
was redesignated as the Foreign Agricultural Service.The 
primary function of the Foreign Agricultural Service has 
been to develop foreign markets for U.S. farm products 
and to report on agricultural activities overseas.  Through 
the network of agricultural attaches stationed around 
the world and agricultural marketing specialists making 
investigations abroad, the Service collected information on 
world agricultural production, foreign agrarian policies, and 
trade competition.  It also made available to American farm 
and business interests published information concerning 
agricultural commodities in world trade.  While the duties 
changed somewhat over time, agricultural attaches were 
responsible for agricultural reporting and analysis, trade 
promotion and market development, participating in 
negotiations with foreign government, advising the local 
U.S. ambassador, assisting official visitors, and explaining 
U.S. agricultural policies and programs to the host 
government and local population.
The Records
The files are arranged by former classification level 
and thereunder in a number of chronological segments, 
thereunder by geographic unit such as a region (“Southeast 
Asia”), country (“USSR”), or colony (“Northern Rhodesia”) 
and thereunder by subject.  Listings of the chronological 
segments and of the major subject headings are found 
below.  The 1960s saw changes to the recordkeeping system. 
Several new headings, most notably “Fairs,” “Utilization 
Reports,” and “Attaché Services,” were added.  In addition, 
a significant number of files documenting international 
organizations such as the EEC, the ECE, the OECD, and the 
FAO, were added under “Europe” or “Special Index” at the 
geographic organization level.  The most significant change 
occurred in 1968 when the Service began requiring certain 
standard, or “DR” reports.  Those reports are filed at the 
beginning of each geographic area and contain information 
about all aspects of the agrarian sector; they are arranged 
chronologically and not by topic.
In addition to the reports sent to the Department of 
Agriculture by agricultural attaches, the files contain 
significant numbers of related reports prepared by U.S. 
diplomatic and consular officers that also will be found 
among the files of the Department of State.  Arrangement 
of these Narrative Reports might make research easier and 
more effective than use of Department of State records, 
depending on the research focus.  The files might also 
contain reports missing from Department of State files. 
Beginning with the 1971 files the documents are almost 
exclusively of Department of Agriculture origin.
The following list (see next page) of subjects indicates 
the topics generally covered by the Narrative Reports.  The 
files for a given country do not necessarily include reports 
under every subject heading (in the 1960s, the subject 
heading “Grains and Feeds” replaced “Feed Stuffs”)
The central files of the Department of State overlap 
the Narrative Reports found among the records of the 
Narrative Reports of the Foreign 
Agricultural Service
David A. Langbart
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Foreign Agricultural Service.  For example, the 
“Agriculture” section of the 1950 Department 
of State filing manual contains headings for 
agriculture, soil, pests, field crops, grains 
fibers, alkaloidal plants, forage crops, sugar-
yielding plants, garden crops, fruits, flowers, 
trees, animal husbandry, and wild animals. 
The files under those headings are often broken 
down even further.  The section on “grains,” 
for example, includes sub-files on wheat, 
buckwheat, oats, rye, corn, barley, rice, hops, 
and “other field crops.”  The complete filing 
manuals are available on the NARA website 




The main series of files is divided into 
the following time segments: 1904-1939, 1920-
1941, 1942-1945, 1946-1949, 1950-1954, 1955-1961 
(includes the Formerly Confidential Reports, 
too), 1962-1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969-1970, 1971-
1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978-1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 
1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994.  There are 
box lists for all of the records dating through 
1984 to assist with indentifying and requesting 
records pertinent to a specific topic.  As the 
National Archives processes the records for the more recent 
period, it will create box lists or other finding aids to assist 
with locating files of interest.  
The Formerly Confidential Reports are in the following 
time blocks: 1940-1954, 1962-1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969-
1970.  There are box lists for all of the records to assist with 
indentifying records of interest.  
Other Records
In addition to the Narrative Reports, there are 
numerous other records in RG 166 that will be of interest. 
Some examples are:  
Textual Records
• Records of the International Institute of Agriculture, 
1922-1941 (RG 166 Entry NC-113-13)
• Records Concerning International Agricultural 
Conferences, 1922-1941 (RG 166 Entry NC-113-14)
• General Correspondence, 1942-1949 and 1950-1972 (RG 
166 Entries A1-1A and 1B) 
• Attaché Reports Relating to International Agricultural 
Conferences and Congresses (“Special Index”), 1931-1958 
(RG 166 Entry A1-4A)
• Reports Relating to International Agricultural Conferences 
and Agreements, 1960-1965 (RG 166 Entry A1-5)
• Records Relating to Trade Missions, 1954 (RG 166 Entry 
A1-6)
• Records Relating to Tariff Negotiations, 1947-1956 (RG 166 
Entry A1-7)
• Policy Correspondence, 1951-1964 (RG 166 Entry A1-17)
Electronic Records
• Global Agriculture Information Network (GAIN) Reports, 
1998-2011.  The records consist of reports that provide 
information on a range of subjects relating to agricultural 
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SHAFR Council Meetings Minutes
Friday, January 3, 2014
Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, DC
Members present: Robert Brigham, Carol Chin, Christopher Dietrich, Penny Von Eschen, Rebecca Herman, Fredrik 
Logevall (presiding), Alan McPherson, Sarah Snyder, Thomas Zeiler
Others present: David Hadley, Peter Hahn, Andrew Johns, Kelly Shannon
Business Items 
(1) Welcome, introductions, and announcements
Logevall called the meeting to order at 8:19 AM. He welcomed new Council members Brigham, McPherson, and Von 
Eschen. Logevall made brief introductory remarks expressing the honor he felt at being selected to serve as president, 
and his desire for SHAFR to seek ways to reach out to other organizations while continuing the  efforts of past years to 
internationalize SHAFR. 
(2) Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council members 
Logevall expressed admiration for the four recently retired Council members Andrew Rotter, Laura Belmonte, Mary 
Dudziak, and Marc Selverstone.  Brigham moved a resolution of thanks to these four recent members.  The motion was 
seconded and passed unanimously. 
(3) Recap of motions passed by e-mail vote
Hahn read into the minutes a summary of the four motions that Council passed by e-mail correspondence since the 
June 2013 meeting: the approval of minutes of June meeting; the final approval of transfer of management of SHAFR 
endowments to TIAA CREF; the approval of extending the terms of Andrew Johns as Passport editor and Mitch Lerner as 
Passport consulting editor to December 31, 2017; and the approval of the NCH petition in favor of maintaining the CIA’s 
open source information program. 
(4) Motion to accept 2013 financial report
Hahn presented oral and written reports on the finances in 2013 and a budget for 2014. He explained that the checking 
account showed a negative balance in 2013, and that after consulting the Ways & Means Committee he had transferred 
funds from the endowment to cover any immediate shortfalls. He further explained that the growth of the endowment 
significantly exceeded the deficit in the checking account. The budget for 2014 reflected continuity with recent past 
operating budgets. Another deficit in the operating budget was anticipated in 2014, as was sufficient Endowment growth 
to cover it. 
A thorough discussion on revenue and expenditure expectations and patterns ensued.  It was clarified that the Bylaws do 
not set a cap on withdrawals from the endowment and that the only part of the endowment that was restricted would be 
the original amount gifted, which current activity did not begin to approach.  Discussion also touched on the pros and 
cons of altering membership dues and on recent trends in the membership levels.
Chin made a motion to accept the report, which was seconded and passed unanimously. 
(5) Motions from Ways & Means Committee
Hahn introduced a proposal to change SHAFR’s fiscal year to a November 1 to October 31 basis, to ease year-end 
reporting. Hahn explained that it would be relatively easy to manage the change via the accountant and the endowment 
manager. Von Eschen moved to approve the proposal. Herman seconded the motion and it passed unanimously. 
Zeiler discussed SHAFR’s past support of the Transatlantic Studies Association with an annual subsidy.  In June, Council 
delayed a decision on a 2014 subsidy pending clarification of financial balances. Discussion followed as to whether 
SHAFR should continue the subsidy, and to what purpose. A consensus emerged that, as SHAFR desired to foster 
connections with fellow historical organizations, the subsidy should continue as long as it served the goal of promoting 
SHAFR/TSA connections. Zeiler moved that SHAFR fund $2,000 annually in 2014-2016, to subsidize the TSA annual 
conference on terms to be approved by the SHAFR president. The resolution passed unanimously. 
Council discussed SHAFR’s subsidy to the National History Center. SHAFR had provided subsidies in 2010, 2011, and 
2013 to support NHC’s lecture series at the Wilson Center. In 2013, Council discontinued the subsidy based on various 
concerns with the administration of the series. The NHC renewed its request. Discussion followed about the merits of 
the subsidy, with a consensus emerging that it would be worthwhile if SHAFR’s contribution were recognized and if 
the content of lectures featured foreign policy. It was moved that SHAFR renew its support for up to three years with 
the stipulation that Wilson Center talks be related to foreign policy, broadly defined, that SHAFR’s contribution be 
recognized, and that the president of SHAFR approve the second and third year renewals based on the management of 
the series. The resolution passed unanimously. 
Council discussed a recommendation from the Membership Committee that membership in SHAFR should be 
mandatory for scholars presenting at the annual SHAFR conference. Questions were raised about the impact of this 
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requirement on non-members and about the number of non-members who presented at recent conferences.  Logevall 
moved to table the item until further information on participation at SHAFR conferences could be garnered. The motion 
passed unanimously. 
Council heard recommendations from the Web Committee and Ways and Means Committee regarding compensation to 
the SHAFR webmaster appointed in 2013. The first year of the position revealed that the position required significantly 
more work than had been anticipated.  Von Eschen moved to double the salary of the webmaster as recommended by the 
Ways and Means Committee. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously. 
The Council also heard the recommendation of the Ways and Means Committee that the compensation for the Executive 
Director should be increased by four percent in 2014. A motion was introduced to that effect, was seconded, and passed 
unanimously. (Hahn vacated the meeting room for the discussion on this item).
 
(6) Governance issues
Recalling that Council recently had approved the extension of the terms of the Passport editor and consulting editor 
to December 31, 2017, Logevall noted that Council members had asked for clarification of appointment and renewal 
procedures in the future.  A consensus emerged that a formal process for appointments or renewals should be 
established. It was moved that no later than June 2016, Council should welcome applications for a term as Passport 
editor(s) beginning on January 1, 2018; that a request for renewal by the current editors would be welcomed at that time; 
and that a decision would be reached by January 2017. The resolution was seconded and passed unanimously. 
A discussion ensued about the possibility of empowering the president to sign petitions on behalf of the Society.  In 
light of the speed with which presidents could consult Council members by e-mail, it was agreed that presidents should 
continue to engage in this practice of seeking Council approval of all petitions.
(7) The SHAFR Guide to the Literature
 
Council heard a report from the ad hoc Committee on the SHAFR guide. The Committee reported that SHAFR  members 
expressed great appreciation for the Guide but considerable concern about the difficulty in accessing it on-line. Strong 
support was expressed for continuing the Guide and addressing access issues. It was noted that the Guide would require 
a dedicated editor-in-chief and the services of numerous chapter editors. It was decided that a posting for the position of 
editor should be made in the pages of Passport with a deadline of May 15, 2014, and that a final decision should be reached 
by July 1, 2014. Chin moved to approve these recommendations. Von Eschen seconded the motion, which was approved 
unanimously. In confidence, Council directed Hahn to explore legal matters pertaining the Guide and report to Council 
by e-means. 
(8) Report from the Web Committee
Herman presented a report from the Web Committee, which unanimously recommended that Council approve a 
proposal from Liefa to redesign the SHAFR website. Herman explained the several benefits that Liefa would provide by 
way of justifying the recommendation.  Zeiler moved to approve this recommendation. Logevall seconded the motion, 
which was approved unanimously. 
(9) Liability insurance and employee dishonesty bond 
Hahn reported on SHAFR’s liability insurance policy and employee dishonesty bond.  Noting that these policies had 
been in force for many years, Hahn recommended that Council review both policies for the purpose of ensuring that 
they provided appropriate coverage at appropriate prices.  Hahn offered to conduct the review, or to assist a committee 
thereto, and report back to Council in June, before the next renewal deadlines. 
Brigham moved that Council empower Hahn to investigate the issues and report via the Ways and Means Committee to 
Council in June 2014. Herman seconded the motion, and Council approved it unanimously. 
(10)  Use of SHAFR’s e-mail list
Logevall introduced a proposal from Kristin Hoganson and Richard Immerman authorizing use of the SHAFR e-mail 
to send advocacy messages pertaining to the work of the National Coalition for History, or authorizing them to solicit 
members to sign up for email advocacy messages. A consensus emerged that the SHAFR e-mail list should not be used 
for advocacy messages, but should be reserved for SHAFR business only
(11) Nominating Committee proposal on tie-breaker procedures
Hahn noted that the 2013 SHAFR election included a race decided by a single vote and that the Bylaws contain no 
tie-breaker provisions. After consulting Mark Bradley, he had recommended to the Nominating Committee that they 
recommend a tie-breaker procedure for Council to consider.  The Nominating Committee recommended that in the event 
of a tie, the election would be decided by the SHAFR Council at its next meeting. When discussion clarified that this 
procedure would make it impossible for the winner to attend that meeting, Hahn suggested that the proposal should 
be amended to empower the current Council to resolve a tie within one week of the close of the election. A motion was 
made and seconded to amend the Bylaws by adding this sentence to Bylaws, Article 2, Section 5(e): “In the event of a tie, 
the current Council, with the exception of the President, will vote to elect one of the candidates. This vote will take place 
by electronic means, by secret ballot, and within one week of the conclusion of the regular election.” Council passed this 
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motion unanimously and directed Hahn to place a referendum on this item on the 2014 election ballot. 
(12) Copyright on contents of Diplomatic History and Passport 
Logevall introduced the question of whether Diplomatic History and Passport should allow authors to retain authorial 
copyright. A consensus emerged that the current system, in which Diplomatic History and Passport hold the copyright, 
should remain in place.  
(13) Discussion of strategic plan for Passport 
Logevall noted that Passport is in strong condition and that, in the interest of time, a planned discussion of a strategic plan 
for Passport would be postponed to June. 
Reports
(14) Summer Institute Oversight Committee 
Zeiler report that the plans for the 2014 Summer Institute at Williams College are proceeding as made clear by a written 
report from co-hosts Mark Lawrence and James McAllister circulated in advance of the meeting.  Zeiler also reported 
that the 2015 Summer Institute will be held at Ohio State University, as approved by Council previously. He reported that 
the recently-received final report on the 2013 Institute indicated another successful year and affirmation that the program 
continues to reach high achievement.
(15) Diplomatic History  
Council accepted a report on Diplomatic History circulated in advance of the meeting. 
(16) 2014 SHAFR annual meeting 
Snyder reported on the progress made by the Program Committee to solicit proposals for the June 19-21, 2014 annual 
meeting in Lexington, Kentucky.  She noted that logistic arrangements were proceeding well and that the number 
of submissions was the highest ever for a meeting held outside of Washington, D.C. She reported that the local 
arrangements committee had secured some $10,000 in funds from the University of Kentucky.
(17) 2015 and 2016 SHAFR annual meetings 
Hahn reported that the 2015 SHAFR annual meeting would be held in the same hotel as the 2013 meeting—the 
Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, VA—on June 24-28, 2015.  Hahn further noted that a call for 
applications to host the 2016 meeting has been published in Passport with an April 2014 deadline and that Council would 
be able to decide a host at its June meeting.
Logevall noted that the Membership Committee has recommended holding an annual meeting outside of North America 
in the future. He recommended that, rather than decide one way or the other, Council should consider proposals from 
outside North America to host the 2016 meeting.
(18) Prizes and Fellowships
On behalf of the selection committees, Hahn announced the winners of various 2014 fellowships and prizes: the Michael 
J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship was awarded to Patrick Chung; the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant 
was awarded to Nguyet Nguyen; the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship was awarded to Zach Fredman; the Lawrence 
Gelfand - Armin Rappaport - Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship was awarded to Heidi M. Krajewski; and the Stuart 
L. Bernath Lecture Prize was awarded to Lien-Hang T. Nguyen. Council members expressed congratulations to the 
awardees. 
Other Business
(19) Announcements and other business 
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Recent Books of Interest:
Al-Enazy, Askar H. The Creation of Saudi Arabia: Ibn Saud and British Imperial Policy, 1914-1927 (Routledge, 2014).
Babiracki, Patryk and Kenyon Zimmer, ed. Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange Across the Soviet Bloc, 
1940s-1960s (TAMU, 2014). 
Barrington, Nicholas. Envoy: A Diplomatic Journey (Tauris, 2014). 
Barnes, Robert. The US, the UN and the Korean War: Communism in the Far East and the American Struggle for Hegemony in 
America’s Cold War (Tauris, 2014).
Baxter, Christopher, Michael L. Dockdrill, and Keith Hamilton, eds. Britain in Global Politics Volume 1: From Gladstone to 
Churchill (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
Baxter, Christopher, Michael L. Dockdrill, and Keith Hamilton, eds. Britain in Global Politics Volume 2: From Churchill to Blair 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
Bentley, Michelle. Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Foreign Policy: The Strategic Use of a Concept (Routledge, 2014).
Bluth, Christoph. US Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Politics, Energy and Security (Tauris, 2014).
Brands, Hal. What Good is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush 
(Cornell, 2014). 
Buchanan, Andrew. American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean During World War II (Cambridge, 2014). 
Bunch, Clea. The United States and Jordan: Middle East Diplomacy during the Cold War (Tauris, 2014).
Cabanes, Bruno. The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924 (Cambridge, 2014). 
Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs. The Great Silent Majority: Nixon’s 1969 Speech on Vietnamization (TAMU, 2014).
Chirot, Daniel, Gi-Wook Shin, and Daniel Sneider, eds. Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies 
(Washington, 2014).
Cogliano, Francis D. Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy (Yale, 2014).
Cormac, Rory. Confronting the Colonies: British Intelligence and Counterinsurgency  (Oxford, 2014).
Costigliola, Frank, ed. The Kennan Diaries (W.W. Norton, 2014). 
Crandall, Russell. America’s Dirty Wars: Irregular Warfare from 1776 to the War on Terror (Cambridge, 2014). 
Crosby, Travis L. The Unknown Lloyd George: A Statesman in Conflict (Tauris, 2014).
Cunliffe, Philip. Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the Global South (Hurst, 2014). 
Dinan, Desmond. Origins and Evolution of the European Union (Oxford, 2014). 
Dodge, Toby. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building Denied (C. Hurst, 2014). 
Donaldson, Robert H., Joseph L. Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring 
Interests (M.E. Sharpe, 2014).
Gloe, David, Len Scott, and Christopher Andrew, eds. An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year Retrospective 
(Routledge, 2014). 
Gries, Peter. The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives over Foreign Affairs (Stanford, 
2014).
Grossman, Matt. Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and American Policy Change Since 1945 (Oxford, 2014). 
Guerriero, Thomas Anthony. MIlitary Involvement and Trade Treaties (Trafford, 2014).
Haddad, John R. America’s First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation (Temple, 2014).
Hiltermann, Joost R. A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge, 2014).
Hughes, R. Gerald. The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Bloomsburg, 2014).
Husain, Aiyaz. Mapping the End of Empire: American and British Strategic Vision in the Postwar World (Harvard, 2014). 
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Hybel, Alex Roberto. US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy: Responses to International Challenges (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014).
Jensen, Richard Bach. The Battle against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878-1934 (Cambridge, 2014). 
Jersild, Austin. The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (North Carolina, 2014).
Judis, John B. Genesis: Truman, American Jews, and the Origins of the Arab/Israeli Conflict (Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2014).
Kaplan, Robert D. Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (Penguin, 2014).
Kazuhiro, Takii. Ito Hirobumi - Japan’s First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji Constitution (Routledge, 2014). 
Kirshner, Orin. American Trade Politics and the Triumph of Globalism (Routledge, 2014).
Levy, Jack S. and John A. Vasquez, eds. The Outbreak of the First World War: Structure, Politics, and Decision-Making (Cambridge, 
2014).
Lewis, Mark. The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919-1950 (Oxford, 2014). 
Long, Stephen. The CIA and the Soviet Bloc: Political Warfare, the Origins of the CIA and Countering Communism in Europe 
(Tauris, 2014).
Mariager, Rasmus, Kjersti Brathagen, and Karl Molin, eds. Human Rights in Europe During the Cold War (Routledge, 2014). 
Maurer, John and Christopher M. Bell, eds. At the Crossroads Between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930 
(Naval Institute Press, 2014). 
McKillen, Elizabeth. Making the World Safe for Workers:  Labor, the Left, and Wilsonian Internationalism  (Illinois, 2013).
McPherson, Alan. The Invaded: How Latin Americans and their Allies Fought and Ended US Occupations (Oxford, 2014). 
Mertha, Andrew. Brothers in Arms: Chinese Aid to the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979 (Cornell, 2014).
Migdal, Joel S. Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East (Columbia, 2014).
Morefield, Jeanne. Empires without Imperialism: Anglo-American Decline and the Politics of Deflection (Oxford, 2014).
Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel and Federico Romero, eds. International Summitry and Global Governance: The Rise of the G7 and 
the European Council, 1974-1991 (Routledge, 2014).
Murphy, Philip. Monarchy and the End of Empire: The House of Windsor, the British Government, and the Postwar Commonwealth 
(Oxford, 2014). 
Peterson, James W. American Foreign Policy: Alliance Politics in a Century of War, 1914-2014 (Bloomsbury, 2014). 
Risso, Linda. Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service (Routledge, 2014). 
Rosendorf, Neal M. Franco Sells Spain to America: Hollywood, Tourism and Public Relations as Postwar Spanish Soft Power 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
Röhl, John C.G. Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941, trans. Sheila de Bellaigue and Roy Bridge (Cambridge, 
2014).
Sanchez-Sibony, Oscar. Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, 
2014).
Shore, Zachary. A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind (Oxford, 2014).
Silbey, Joel H., ed. A Companion to the Antebellum Presidents, 1937-1861 (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014).
Sills, Peter. Toxic War: The Story of Agent Orange (Vanderbilt, 2014).
Stone, Dan. Goodbye to All That?: A History of Europe Since 1945 (Oxford, 2014).
Striner, Richard. Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Burden to Great Bear (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). 
Thigpen, Jennifer. Island Queens and Mission Wives: How Gender and Empire Remade Hawai’i’s Pacific World (North Carolina, 
2014). 
Thorpe, Rebecca U. The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending (Chicago, 2014). 
Turner, Oliver. American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, 2014).
Wagner, Wolfgang, Wouter Werner, and Michal Onderco, eds. Deviance in International Relations: ‘Rogue States’ and International 
Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
Warner, Michael. The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History (Georgetown, 2014).
Wilson, James Graham. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War 
(Cornell, 2014). 
Wilson, Theodore A. Coalition Warfare: A Guide to the Issues (Praeger, 2014). 
Zimmerman, William. Ruling Russia: Authoritarianism from the Revolution to Putin (Princeton, 2014).
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W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship: $4,000
Winner: Zach Fredman, Boston University 
“Dissertation Title: A Wary Embrace: American Soldiers and the People of China, 1941-1947”
Making use of new and rarely-used sources across China, Burma, England, and the United States, Fredman is developing a 
fundamental reappraisal of the wartime relationship between the United States and China. Focusing on the transformation 
in the Chinese reception of and relationship with American troops from cooperative to hostile, he convincingly makes 
the case for the limitations of the U.S.-centric scholarship. In the process, Fredman argues that including local Chinese 
sources and Chinese historiography offers a new perspective on how and why the relationship deteriorated over the war 
that will force reconsiderations of the traditional narratives.  Equal parts international history and local history, Fredman’s 
dissertation makes painstaking study of municipal and personal records to reimagine the wartime alliance from the bottom 
up. Fredman is well equipped to undertake this ambitious project, having spent years in China and Taiwan and developed 
fluency in Mandarin. After years in Chinese archives, the fellowship will help Fredman complete the domestic side of his 
research, facilitating trips to the National Archives, Hoover Institution, George C. Marshall Library, US Army Heritage and 
Education Center, and the Marine Corps Historical Center.
Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Fellowship - $4,000
Winner: Nguyet Nguyen
Dissertation Title: “‘The world is on our side’”: the Vietnamese Diaspora and People’s Diplomacy during the Second 
Indochina War”
Nguyen’s dissertation presents a fascinating and ground breaking examination of Vietnamese exiles’ efforts at international 
diplomacy with anti-war activists in the United States and Western Europe aimed at convincing Washington to end its 
intervention in the Vietnam War.  Her work represents a highly original example of transnational history “from below” 
that explores the actions of individuals, social movements, and NGOs while still focusing on the crucial role of the state in 
international conflict.   Her research emphasizes the all-too-often-ignored Vietnamese component in the global struggle for 
“hearts and minds” during that divisive war, as well as the transnational element in a struggle that “crossed borders” both 
literally and psychologically on a number of levels.  The Bernath Fellowship will help finance Nguyet’s ambitious research 
schedule in American, Vietnamese, and French archives, as well as her planned oral interviews with a wide range of 
participants in her subject matter. Her fluency in Vietnamese, French, and English will greatly enhance her work and also 
speaks to the kind of multi-archival sophistication that so many young and pioneering scholars in our field are bringing to 
foreign relations history.  Nguyen’s project promises to set a high standard in this exciting direction.
Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport-Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship: $4,000
Winner:  Heidi Krajewski, Tulane University
Dissertation Title:  “Fault Lines: Development, Disaster, and Revolution in Managua, Nicaragua, 1962-1982”
Equal parts local and transnational history, Heidi Krajewski’s dissertation imaginatively employs both time-honored and 
cutting-edge research methods to reconceptualize how and where developmentalism figured into the fall of Nicaragua’s 
Somoza dynasty.  Focusing on several Managua neighborhoods most affected by the earthquake that devastated the 
country in 1972, her work combines multinational archival research with GIS mapping technology to chart the spatial 
relationship among U.S. and Nicaraguan-led redevelopment efforts, the urban poverty that persisted despite those uneven 
efforts, and growing anti-Somoza political activity.  Such mapping of the geography of development (or the lack thereof) 
reveals the importance of developmentalist discourse even though developmentalism itself failed, Krajewski finds.  That 
is, U.S.-Nicaraguan plans initially raised expectations.  When the promised redevelopment never materialized, however, 
that fact frustrated, and further radicalized, Managua’s poor neighborhoods, which were every bit as central as rural areas 
to the success of the Sandinista Revolution.  This fellowship will help Krajewski, who is proficient in Spanish, undertake 
an extended research trip to Managua, where she will examine records housed at the Nicaraguan National Archives, the 
National Bank of Nicaragua, and the University of Central America.
Dispatches
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Report for William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants Awards, 2013-2014
The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured 
college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and are working as professional historians. 
Grants are limited to scholars working on their first research monograph. Membership in SHAFR is required prior to 
application, and all applications must be supported by a letter of recommendation. A limited number of grants of varying 
amounts (generally, up to $2,000 each) are awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel to 
conduct research on significant scholarly projects in the field of U.S. foreign relations. 
The awards committee comprises three members of SHAFR, each appointed in a different year by the sitting president of 
the organization. Each member serves a term of three years and in his or her third year serves as chair of the committee. 
In the academic year 2013-2014 the following members served on the committee: Barbara Reeves-Ellington, Siena College 
(chair), Molly Wood, Wittenberg University, and Christopher McKnight Nichols, Oregon State University.
Fourteen scholars applied for grants by the deadline of October 1, 2013. The awards winners were announced at the SHAFR 
luncheon held on Saturday, January 4, 2014 at the American Historical Association annual conference in Washington D.C. 
Brandon Mills, Lecturer, University of Colorado, Denver, was awarded $1,000 to conduct research at the Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C, for the project “Exporting the Racial Republic: African Colonization and the Transformation 
of U.S. Expansion,” in which he demonstrates convincingly that the African colonization movement redefined the ways in 
which Americans thought about race, citizenship and nationalism, and linked them not just to the question of slavery but 
to ideas about U.S. expansion, global power, and American empire. Dr. Mills’s dissertation committee co-chairs were Dr. 
Kristin Hoganson and Dr David Roediger,, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Tore Olsson, Asst. Professor, University of Tennessee, was awarded $1,000 to conduct research in Mexico City for the project 
“Agrarian Crossings: The American South, Mexico, and the Twentieth-Century Remaking of the Rural World,” in which 
he argues that the Green Revolution, far from being a product of the Cold War, had its origins in the post-emancipation 
American South and owed much to a regional transnational dialogue about agrarian reform that emerged through U.S.-
Mexican relations in the early twentieth century. Dr. Olsson’s dissertation advisor was Dr. Shane Hamilton, University of 
Georgia. 
Colleen Woods, Asst. Professor, University of Maryland, was awarded $2,000 to conduct research in the Philippines for 
the project “Bombs, Bureaucrats, and Rosary Beads: The United States, the Philippines and the Making of Global Anti-
Communism, 1935-1965,” which illuminates the multiple points of anti-communism in the Cold War by showing how 
Filipino colonial elites and U.S. policymakers developed transnational networks of anticommunists through which they 
crafted and exported anticommunist language designed to influence development in postcolonial societies around the 
world. Dr. Woods’s dissertation advisor was Dr. Penny von Eschen, University of Michigan.
Respectfully submitted by Barbara Reeves-Ellington, November 18, revised November 21, 2013
Samuel Flagg Bemis Grant Award Final Report
“The Transnational ‘Cold’ War in the Greater Caribbean Basin: Revolutionary Exiles, Presidents, Counter-Revolutionary 
Exiles, Dictators, and the United States, 1944-1954”
Awarded in 2013, the Samuel Flagg Bemis grant from SHAFR has been a critical source of support for my international 
research. At the University of Arkansas, my dissertation is an international and transnational examination of exiles, 
presidents, and dictators in the greater Caribbean Basin in the 1940s and 1950s and how numerous battles between these 
groups shaped the region’s ‘Cold’ War and foreign relations. SHAFR’s support through the Bemis grant allowed me to 
pursue my research in never-before-consulted files and newly-discovered collections in the Dominican Republic, Costa 
Rica, and Cuba over the past months. It is because of SHAFR’s support and the Bemis that I have had my success during the 
last six months and established the foundation for my upcoming dissertation and forthcoming articles.
In the Dominican Republic, I began my work at the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) in Santo Domingo at the beginning 
of July. After a couple weeks, archivist Oscar Feliz suggested that I look at some foreign relations collections, some of which 
were completely unknown and seemingly lost in the system’s organization. The vast majority of these files derived from 
the “Foreign Relations” section that has been largely unexamined by Dominican and American historians. Opening these 
never-before-consulted files, I uncovered embassy dispatches, spy reports, exiles’ documents, intelligence networks, and 
far more, such as confirming that Alberto Bayo, a Spanish exile who trained Fidel Castro and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara in 
guerrilla warfare in the 1950s, betrayed Dominican exiles to the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1949. Most importantly, 
these collections contained new documents that revealed how Trujillo, alongside other dictators, waged an international 
war against the governments in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Costa Rica in the 1940s and early 1950s before the US coup in 
Guatemala in 1954. My research has determined that these regimes pursued their own wars and foreign policy, such as 
facilitating the overthrow of Venezuela and supporting Guatemalan exiles, largely independent of the international ‘Cold’ 
War. Such insights were further strengthened when the descendants of Dominican exiles shared their parents’ personal 
collections and archives with me, such as the documents of Dominican exile leader Horacio Ornes at the Museo Memorial 
de la Resistencia Dominicana.
In San José, I worked at the Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica (ANCR). As Costa Rica’s foreign relations too remains an 
understudied topic, I had the opportunity to open never-before-consulted embassy files and consulate reports. These 
items revealed movements of exiles and the country’s foreign relations as well as domestic and international intelligence 
networks. In fact, these collections have generated new materials surrounding Costa Rica’s 1948 Civil War as well as the 
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1955 conflict with Nicaragua. While in Costa Rica, I had the opportunity to talk with the daughter of Honduran exile leader 
Jorge Ribas Montes, Costa Rica’s United Nations ambassador in the late 1940s and foreign relations minister in the mid-
1950s Alberto Cañas, and former Costa Rican president Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier. Together, these investigations 
have provided both new sources and a new perspective regarding Costa Rica’s foreign relations history. Thanks to the 
support of David Díaz-Arias at the Universidad de Costa Rica, I also had the opportunity to present my research and 
receive some useful feedback.
Finally, I went over to Cuba. In Havana, I worked at the Archivo Nacional and the Instituto de Historia de Cuba (IHC). At 
the IHC, I accessed Cuban military and naval attaché reports from the 1950s that, alongside US reports, illustrated how a 
broad movement of exiles and presidents, more than just those alongside Fidel Castro, pursued a war to oust the Cuban 
dictator Fulgencio Batista. Furthermore, many of these exiles and presidents had waged their battles against dictators 
since the Second World War, showing a longer history that moved from the early 1940s into the Cuban Revolution. At 
the Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba José Martí, I read the newspapers put out by Dominican exiles in Havana. Finally, I was 
granted permission to work at the Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores in Havana. Once again, I had 
the unique opportunity to access never-before-consulted and largely-unexamined files that have provided new insights 
into exiles’ movements, regional actors’ foreign policy, and an international history of the greater Caribbean Basin. Before 
leaving Cuba, I shared a part of this investigation in a presentation at the IHC.
I again want to express my gratitude to SHAFR for having supported my research. Without the Bemis grant, I would not 
have had the opportunity to work in newly-discovered collections in the Dominican Republic, never-before-consulted files 
in Costa Rica, and never-before-utilized items in Cuba.
Aaron Coy Moulton, University of Arkansas, acmoulto@uark.edu
Dear Professor Hahn,
I am writing to express my gratitude for the assistance provided to me through the Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant. I 
was able to use the funds to defray the cost of trips to New York and Boston, where I consulted archival materials at Columbia 
University, the United Nations archives, MIT and the Massachusetts Historical Society respectively. My dissertation, 
tentatively titled, “The Pursuit of Multilateral Economic Development Aid: the United Nations, the U.S. and the Third World, 
1957-1961,” examines the triangular relationship between leading figures within the UN Secretariat, US policymakers in 
the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, and key Third World member states at the UN. It investigates the extent 
to which each party attempted to frame and direct the debate on economic development aid to underdeveloped countries 
as offered by, or channeled through, the United Nations during a period where the Organization’s activities dramatically 
shifted towards North-South issues. 
The sources I accumulated have specifically re-enforced my hypothesis for my current chapter on food aid and the pre-
history of the UN World Food Programme. They revealed the pivotal role played by those within UN Secretariat, like Hans 
Singer, who helped redefine the motives and purpose of food aid from ‘surplus disposal’ to ‘surplus utilization’ and from 
‘food aid for the alleviation of poverty’ to ‘food aid for economic development’. The not-so-subtle changes in the food aid 
discourse had meaningful significance for donor and recipient countries at the launching of the First UN Development 
Decade in 1961. Moreover, this change showcased the intellectual capacity of both the UN and US policymakers as food aid 
was now enmeshed in a wider debate on various doctrines of development.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not mention what I considered to be the highlight of my trip, an interview I held with 
Richard N. Gardner, an emeritus professor in the Law Department at Columbia University. Gardner served alongside 
Harlan Cleveland as the deputy assistant undersecretary of state for international organization affairs for the Kennedy 
Administration. Gardner, who was 33 when he joined the Administration, is one of the last surviving policymakers from 
those that Kennedy brought on-board in 1961. Gardner was highly involved in the Administration’s effort to internationalize 
its foreign aid efforts through the UN and the interview was extremely insightful.
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